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Theses
•	 The	post-Soviet	countries,	which	used	to	be	totally	unified	in	legal	and	eco-
nomic	terms	until	1990,	have	been	drifting	apart	in	the	twenty	years	since	
the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	Relations	between	them	have	been	loosening	de-
spite	the	numerous	integration	attempts	which	have	been	made	since	the	
early	1990s.	Declarations	of	integration	have	not	been	put	into	practice	due	
to	 the	great	differences	 in	 the	 interests	of	 individual	 countries.	 In	2009,	
Vladimir	Putin,	who	was	then	the	Russian	prime	minister,	gave	a	success-
ful	 impetus	 for	 establishing	 closer	 relations	within	 a	 still	narrow	group	
of	three	countries:	Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus.	With	determination,	
Russia	embarked	upon	implementing	the	principles	of	the	Customs	Union	
among	 these	 three	 states,	 and	 since	 2012	within	 the	 Common	Economic	
Space	as	well.	This	process	of	integration	was	intended	to	bring	about	the	
introduction	of	 ‘four	freedoms’	 in	this	area:	the	free	movement	of	goods,	
services,	capital	and	labour.	
•	 Despite	 the	 numerous	 limitations	 of	 the	 integration	 process,	 such	 as	 the	
small	number	of	the	participating	states	or	limited	progress	in	implementing	
the	CES,	this	is	still	the	most	advanced	integration	programme	in	the	region	
since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	Progress	in	putting	the	rules	of	the	Customs	
Union	into	practise	can	be	seen	as	a	success	for	Moscow.	In	turn,	the	forma-
tion	of	the	CES	is	still	at	an	early	stage,	and	it	is	difficult	to	determine	at	this	
point	how	deeply	the	three	countries	will	harmonise	their	markets.	
•	 The	implementation	of	the	principles	of	the	Customs	Union	and	the	Com-
mon	Economic	Space	has	been	strongly	motivated	by	political	factors.	Re-
gional	integration	has	become	a	strategic	goal	in	Russia’s	foreign	policy	over	
recent	years.	From	Moscow’s	point	of	view,	building	up	such	 integration	
structures	 is	necessary	 especially	 to	 counteract	 the	 economic	 expansion	
of	the	European	Union	and	China,	as	well	as	the	loosening	of	the	bonds	be-
tween	the	CIS	countries	and	Russia.	At	the	same	time,	close	co-operation	is	
expected	to	guarantee	Russia	that	the	strong	politico-economic	influences	
in	this	area	will	be	maintained.	From	the	viewpoint	of	Kazakhstan	or	Bela-
rus,	integration	with	a	partner	whose	economic,	military	and	geographical	
domination	is	so	strong	raises	the	fear	that	they	will	become	increasingly	
dependent	on	Russia.	However,	on	the	other	hand,	it	guarantees	access	to	
the	Russian	market	 and	 counterbalances	China’s	 economic	 expansion	 in	
Kazakhstan.	In	the	case	of	Belarus,	it	allows	preferential	conditions	of	eco-
nomic	co-operation	with	Russia	to	be	maintained.	It	is	worth	noting	that	
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regional	integration	barely	contributes	to	the	economic	modernisation	of	
this	area.	The	CIS	countries	are	searching	for	the	new	legal	solutions,	tech-
nologies,	know-how	and	funds	necessary	to	implement	reforms	and	diver-
sify	their	economies	primarily	outside	the	region,	mainly	in	the	West,	and	
not	in	Russia.	
•	 Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus	are	becoming	more	and	more	integrated	
on	 conditions	 dictated	 by	 Russia,	which	 are	 at	 times	more	 protectionist	
than	those	which	have	so	far	obtained	in	these	countries.	This	means	the	
deterioration	of	the	principles	of	third-country	access	to	the	market	of	this	
region,	and	a	relative	improvement	in	the	competitiveness	of	Russian	prod-
ucts	 in	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan.	The	Custom	Union	 is	being	 implement-
ed	at	 the	expense	of	these	countries’	relations	with	the	European	Union.	
Never	theless,	the	integration	process	also	offers	some	benefits	to	European	
countries.	Lifting	trade	barriers	broadens	 their	sales	markets,	standard-
ises	the	conditions	of	their	operation	on	these	markets	(in	compliance	with	
the	principles	of	the	World	Trade	Organisation),	and	contributes	to	reduc-
ing	the	prospective	exporters’	and	investors’	expenses.
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InTroducTIon: The ups and downs of eurasIan 
InTegraTIon
On	9	June	2009,	the	Russian	prime	minister,	Vladimir	Putin,	after	his	meeting	
in	Moscow	with	the	leaders	of	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan,	announced	that	these	
three	states	had	embarked	upon	the	creation	of	a	Customs	Union.	At	that	time,	
his	announcement	sounded	like	a	repetition	of	a	slogan	which	had	been	heard	
many	times	before.	After	all,	as	early	as	September	1993,	a	group	of	countries	
belonging	to	the	Commonwealth	of	Independent	States	(which	had	been	formed	
on	the	ruins	of	the	collapsing	Soviet	Union	just	a	year	and	a	half	previously)	had	
signed	an	agreement	which	envisaged	the	creation	of	a	free	trade	zone.	to	be	fol-
lowed	by	a	customs	union	and	later	an	economic	union.	This	was	expected	to	be	
a	gradual	process	of	a	new	(re)integration	of	this	area.	In	January	1995,	a	customs	
union	agreement	was	signed	by	Russia	and	Belarus,	soon	to	be	joined	by	Kazakh-
stan,	and	then	in	1996	by	Kyrgyzstan	and	in	1999	by	Tajikistan.	
However,	 too	 many	 factors	 were	 working	 against	 the	 integration	 process.	
It	was	initiated	by	Russia,	which	had	from	the	very	beginning	aspired	to	play	
the	 role	 of	 hegemon	 in	 the	 post-Soviet	 area.	 The	 process	was	 formally	 sup-
ported	by	such	countries	as	Belarus,	Kazakhstan	and	the	remaining	Central	
Asian	countries,	which	were	strongly	connected	to	Russia	(and	some	of	which	
were	even	economically	dependent	on	it),	to	whom	the	ongoing	disintegration	
of	economic	bonds	meant	the	greatest	losses.	However,	even	they	had	a	differ-
ent	vision	for	integration	than	did	Russia,	and	were	using	this	process	for	their	
own	needs,	as	a	means	to	solve	their	current	problems.	Many	of	these	coun-
tries,	like	Ukraine,	saw	these	agreements	more	as	a	way	to	arrange	a	‘velvet	di-
vorce’	from	the	former	USSR	rather	than	a	transition	to	a	new	kind	of	commu-
nity.	They	were	focused	on	turning	themselves	into	independent	states,	also	in	
economic	terms.	
However,	paradoxically,	Russia	itself	was	the	main	cause	of	the	failure	of	inte-
gration	efforts	at	that	time.	It	had	to	deal	with	an	economic	crisis	and	carry	out	
painful	reforms;	so	it	really	did	not	want	to	bear	the	costs	of	what	effectively	
was	subsidising	the	economies	of	the	other	CIS	countries,	most	of	which	had	
chosen	other	economic	policy	models	based	even	less	on	free	market	princi-
ples.	Nor	could	it	really	afford	this.	For	this	reason,	the	rouble	zone	collapsed	in	
summer	1993,	when	the	monetary	reform	in	Russia	forced	other	CIS	countries	
to	introduce	their	own	national	currencies,	even	though	some	of	them	had	not	
planned	to	do	so.	It	was	also	Russia	which	in	fact	blocked	the	implementation	
of	the	free-trade	zone	agreement	signed	in	1994	by	most	of	the	CIS	countries.	
8O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
13
Furthermore,	a	number	of	Russian	initiatives	–	including	the	customs	union	
project	in	1995,	and	especially	the	subsequent	agreements	with	Belarus	(1996,	
1997,	1999)	envisaging	the	creation	of	a	kind	of	a	union	state	–	were	in	fact	su-
perficial	political	and	propaganda	actions	aimed	at	rescuing	the	reputation	of	
President	Boris	Yeltsin,	whose	popularity	in	Russia	had	been	weakening.	
These	factors,	along	with	the	deepening	differences	in	interests	and	develop-
ment	levels,	the	lack	of	basic	trust,	the	use	of	protectionism	to	cushion	the	weak	
economies,	which	were	unprepared	to	face	competition,	meant	that	despite	the	
numerous	agreements	 signed,	 the	 1990s	were	 in	 fact	a	period	of	accelerated	
disintegration	of	what	had	been	a	uniform	economic	area	in	the	Soviet	period.	
A	breakthrough	was	expected	when	a	new,	vigorous	leader,	Vladimir	Putin,	took	
power	in	Russia	at	the	beginning	of	2000.	Indeed,	his	coming	to	power	coincided	
with	new	initiatives	–	the	countries	participating	in	the	customs	union	signed	
an	agreement	 in	October	2000	setting	up	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community	
(EAEC).	However,	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 agreements	 signed	 and	 the	 con-
struction	of	the	new	community’s	structures	(some	of	which	were	by	definition	
supranational)	again	met	with	great	impediments.	The	states	involved	had	dif-
ferent	interests,	and	they	lacked	strong	economic	and	political	motivation.	
Russia	became	the	source	of	economic	motivation	in	response	to	the	launch	of	
a	new	European	Union	initiative	in	2003,	which	a	year	later	became	known	as	
the	European	Neighbourhood	Policy.	Moscow	saw	this	as	a	challenge	to	its	he-
gemony	in	the	CIS	area,	which	was	especially	dangerous	in	the	case	of	Ukraine,	
a	country	it	sees	as	strategically	significant	for	many	reasons.	This	was	the	pri-
mary	origin	of	another	Russian	initiative,	the	Common	Economic	Space	(CES)	
of	Russia,	Ukraine,	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan.	The	March	2003	declaration	and	
the	CES	agreement	of	September	that	same	year,	which	were	signed	under	po-
litical	pressure	 from	Moscow,	were	primarily	aimed	at	pulling	Ukraine	 into	
the	integration	orbit.	However,	this	plan	was	thwarted	when	political	forces	
reluctant	to	join	the	CES	took	power	in	Ukraine	in	2004	as	a	consequence	of	
the	 Orange	 Revolution.	 The	 process	 of	 creating	 the	 CES	 entered	 a	 phase	 of	
stagnation	which	lasted	until	2009.	Then	a	new	economic	factor	emerged:	the	
economic	crisis	(from	autumn	2008),	which	dealt	a	heavy	blow	to	Russia,	and	
an	even	heavier	one	to	Ukraine.	The	other	countries	from	the	CIS	area	were	
also	affected,	albeit	to	a	lesser	extent.	It	could	thus	have	appeared	that	estab-
lishing	closer	economic	co-operation,	trade	liberalisation	and	opening	up	the	
borders	between	the	key	CIS	countries	would	definitely	help	their	economies	
and	accelerate	 their	exit	 from	the	crisis.	Political	 stimuli	were	also	present.	
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In	2009,	the	EU	initiated	the	Eastern	Partnership	programme	(upon	a	motion	
from	Poland	and	Sweden),	which	envisaged	the	negotiation	of	EU	Association	
Agreements	 and	Deep	 and	Comprehensive	 Trade	Area	 agreements	 (DCFTA)	
with	those	eastern	partners	who	had	made	the	most	progress	in	their	reform	
processes	 (Ukraine	and	Moldova	were	 the	first	 to	 start	 this	process).	Russia	
saw	this	as	a	new	challenge,	and	wanted	 to	respond	to	 it	 in	a	decisive	man-
ner.	Moscow	was	also	anxious	about	China’s	increasing	economic	expansion	in	
Central	Asia,	which	was	undermining	Russian	influence	in	the	region,	includ-
ing	in	Kazakhstan,	a	country	of	strategic	significance	for	Russia.	
This	was	 the	 essential	 background	 for	Vladimir	 Putin’s	 initiative	 to	 rapidly	
build	up	the	Customs	Union	of	Russia,	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan.	Another	im-
portant	fact	was	that	Putin	was	the	prime	minister	at	that	time,	whose	formal	
key	prerogative	was	the	economic	policy	of	Russia.	The	idea	of	the	CU	became	
Putin’s	flagship	project	after	that	time.	It	was	so	important	that	in	an	attempt	
to	force	the	EU	and	the	USA	to	recognise	the	Customs	Union	as	a	partner,	he	de-
layed	the	negotiations	concerning	Russia’s	accession	to	the	WTO	by	over	a	year.	
Yet	on	the	other	hand,	it	seemed	that	Putin	had	learnt	some	lessons	from	the	
failures	of	the	previous	integration	processes	in	the	CIS	area.	The	new	initia-
tive	differed	from	the	previous	ones	in	several	important	elements.	
Firstly,	the	draft	agreements	were	prepared	much	more	carefully.	They	were	
significantly	more	specific	and	covered	a	broader	scope	of	issues.	Russia’s	po-
litical	determination	to	implement	them	was	also	greater.	
Secondly,	Russia	made	clear	concessions	 to	 its	partners	 in	 its	effort	 to	make	
them	 genuinely	 interested	 in	 implementing	 the	 agreements.	 Moscow	 used	
the	conditionality	principle	in	this	case	as	well,	but	it	also	used	the	principle	
of	greater	symmetry	of	benefits.	The	impression	could	have	been	gained	that	
Russia	was	 ready	 to	 incur	 significant	but	 temporary	 economic	 costs	 to	 gain	
long-term	political	benefits.	
Thirdly,	unlike	before,	efforts	were	made	 to	ensure	 that	 the	CU	agreements	
were	based	to	a	greater	extent	on	international	standards.	In	particular,	Mos-
cow	forced	 its	partners	de facto to	accept	 that	 the	provisions	of	 the	Customs	
Code	 complied	with	 the	negotiated	protocols	 setting	 the	 conditions	 for	Rus-
sia’s	accession	to	the	WTO.	Another	characteristic	feature	was	the	similarity	
(at	least	on	a	formal	level)	of	the	names	and	institutional	solutions	of	the	initia-
tives	originating	from	Russia	and	the	European	Union.	
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What	the	new	initiative	and	the	previous	ones	had	in	common	was	the	assump-
tion	that	it	would	be	implemented	stage	by	stage,	as	well	as	the	great	ambitions	
of	the	project,	which	from	the	Customs	Union	would	soon	lead	to	the	creation	
of	the	Common	Economic	Space	and	later	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union.	It	was	
also	clear	from	the	very	beginning	that	one	of	Russia’s	key	political	goals	was	
to	make	Ukraine	part	of	the	new	structure.	
This	 text	 is	 an	attempt	 to	 sum	up	 the	progress	which	has	 so	 far	been	made	
in	 implementing	 the	 integration	 initiative	 announced	 by	Vladimir	 Putin	 in	
2009.	The	chapters	of	this	work	provide	an	outline	of	the	following	elements:	
assumptions	 of	 the	 initiatives	 and	progress	 in	 implementing	 its	 subsequent	
stages	(chapter	one);	brief	characteristics	of	the	national	interests,	primarily	
Russia’s,	but	also	those	of	Russia’s	present	and	potential	partners	(chapter	two);	
and	finally,	the	economic	consequences	of	the	integration	process	and	its	out-
look	for	the	future	(chapter	three).	
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I. The assumpTIons of The InTegraTIon InITIaTIve  
of november 2009
1. The documents setting up the customs union and the common 
economic space
Vladimir	Putin’s	declarations	on	integration	forced	Russian	officials	to	activate	
negotiations	with	their	partners	in	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus.	Part	of	the	formal	
and	legal	framework	for	the	structures	being	implemented	was	based	on	agree-
ments	concluded	as	part	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Community.	They	served	
as	reference	for	the	documents	signed	by	Russia,	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	on	
27	November	2009	and	allowed	the	Customs	Union	between	these	countries	
to	be	established	in	2010.	As	a	consequence,	a	single	customs	tariff	started	to	
apply	 in	 the	 three	countries	on	1	 January	2010	(for	 the	first	 time	since	 1991).	
The	 Common	 Customs	 Code	 became	 binding	 on	 Russia	 and	 Kazakhstan	 on	
1	July	2010,	and	on	Belarus	on	6	July	2010.	An	agreement	setting	the	rules	for	
the	distribution	of	incomes	from	import	duty	(as	well	as	taxes	and	other	duties)	
between	the	member	states	of	the	Customs	Union	became	effective	on	1	Sep-
tember	2010.	Furthermore,	the	Custom	Union	member	states	entered	into	an	
agreement	regulating	the	operation	of	the	Customs	Union	within	the	frame-
work	of	the	multilateral	trade	system	on	19	May	2011.	This	agreement	de facto 
meant	that	Russia’s	obligations	with	regard	to	the	World	Trade	Organisation	
(at	that	time	Russia	was	about	to	close	its	accession	negotiations1)	would	also	
become	binding	upon	the	entire	Customs	Union.	
The customs union was just the first stage in the process of these coun-
tries’ integration. In 2010, the parties agreed to form the common eco-
nomic space between 1 January 2012 and the end of 2015, and signed sev-
enteen general agreements2	 concerning	 its	 operation	on	9	December	 2010.	
The	three	countries’	presidents	also	signed	the	following	three	documents	on	
18	November	2011	in	Moscow:	an	agreement	on	the	Eurasian	Economic	Com-
mission,	setting	up	a	body	in	charge	of	integration	coordination;	the	Eurasian	
Economic	Commission	Regulation;	and	the	Declaration	on	Eurasian	Economic	
1	 Russia	officially	joined	the	WTO	on	22	August	2012.	Kazakhstan	is	also	in	the	final	stage	of	
its	negotiations	and	hopes	to	close	them	in	2013.	Belarus’s	accession	process	is	frozen.	
2	 These	documents	were	developed	by	the	Customs	Union	Commission.	The	member	states	
ratified	them	at	express	pace	just	a	few	days	before	the	end	of	2010;	http://www.economy.
gov.by/ru/f_economic/foreign-policy/foreign-affair-integrity/foreign-affair-integrity-
formirovanie-edinogo-ekonomicheskogo-prostranstva
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Integration	which	envisaged	 the	 creation	of	 the	eurasian economic union 
in	2015.	This	structure	was	to	signify	the	close	politico-economic	co-operation	
between	the	three	states.	
The	acquis	of	the	integration	process	initiated	by	Russia	has	been	supplement-
ed	by	executive	acts	and	agreements	containing	more	precise	regulations	in	
addition	to	these	quite	general	documents.	
2. The principles of the integration process of belarus, Kazakhstan 
and russia 
2.1. Integration as part of the customs union
As	the	principles	of	the	Customs	Union	were	being	introduced,	barriers	were	
also	being	lifted	(with	some	exceptions,	mainly	concerning	oil	trade)	in	inter-
nal	 trade	between	these	countries	within	 the	 free	 trade	zone.	Furthermore,	
a	single customs tariff (scT) was	 introduced,	which	was	 to	 a	 great	 extent	
based	on	that	which	had	previously	applied	in	Russia.	80%	of	the	common	cus-
toms	rates	were	the	same	as	the	rates	used	by	Russia.	According	to	the	Customs	
Union	Commission’s	estimates,	before	the	SCT	was	introduced,	import	duties	
in	terms	of	the	number	of	items	had	been	90%	harmonised	between	Russia	and	
Belarus,	but	only	38%	between	Russia	and	Kazakhstan3.	It	should	also	be	noted	
that	the	Russian	trade	policy	was	less	liberal	than	those	adopted	by	Kazakhstan	
or	Belarus.	The	weighted	average	import	duty	rate	in	Russia	in	2009	stood	at	
10%,	which	meant	that	the	other	two	member	states	of	the	Customs	Union	had	
to	raise	their	respective	import	duty	rates.	As	a	consequence	of	these	changes,	
Kazakhstan’s	weighted	average	import	duty	rate	rose	from	6.2%	to	10.6%.	In	the	
case	of	Belarus,	the	increase	in	the	customs	duties	was	significantly	smaller	
and	covered	only	certain	goods,	primarily	cars,	electric	engines	and	 leather	
products.	In	the	next	few	years,	the	import	duties	applicable	in	the	Customs	
Union	are	bound	to	fall,	considering	Russia’s	commitments	to	the	World	Trade	
Organisation	(its	weighted	average	import	duty	rate	should	be	reduced	to	7.8%).	
The	first	changes	in	the	single	tariff,	with	the	customs	conditions	negotiated	by	
Russia	taken	into	account,	were	made	as	early	as	23	August	20124	(when	Russia	
3	 Sergei	Glazev,	Secretary	of	 the	Customs	Union	Commission,	http://www.customs-union.
com/	зачем-нам-нужен-таможенный-союз
4	 The	decision	concerning	this	matter	was	passed	on	16	July	2012	by	the	Eurasian	Economic	
Commission;	 http://www.tsouz.ru/eek/RSEEK/RSEEK/7z/Pages/R_54.aspx;	 http://www.
tsouz.ru/eek/RSEEK/RSEEK/7z/Pages/R_55.aspx
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officially	joined	the	WTO).	The	duty	rates	were	reduced	primarily	for	food	(es-
pecially	pork),	clothes,	steel	products	and	transport	vehicles.	In	general,	the	
weighted	average	import	duty	rate	should	fall	from	the	previous	level	of	9.6%	
to	approximately	7.5%	in	2018.
To	limit	the	negative	consequences	of	the	SCT	introduction,	Kazakhstan	and	
Belarus	had	negotiated	a	list	of	goods	(over	400	items)	which	would	not	be	cov-
ered	by	the	single	tariff	in	the	transitional	period5.	For	example,	until	the	mid-
dle	of	2011	citizens	of	these	two	countries	were	allowed	to	buy	cars	on	the	con-
ditions	which	applied	before	(a	10%	customs	duty	rate,	while	the	SCT	was	25%).	
Kazakhstan	 and	 Belarus	 were	 also	 given	 preferential	 conditions	 until	 2013	
for	importing	means	of	transport	(railway	carriages,	including	cisterns)	and	
furniture.	The	Single	Customs	Tariff	will	also	not	apply	to	medical	diagnostic	
equipment	until	2014,	or	pharmaceuticals	and	aircraft	until	2015.	At	the	same	
time,	 the	duty-free	 import	 of	 aircraft	 spare	parts	was	not	 restricted	by	any	
timeframe.	When	the	Single	Customs	Tariff	was	adjusted	to	Russia’s	commit-
ments	to	the	WTO,	approximately	120	groups	of	goods	were	still	excluded	from	
the	SCT,	for	instance	cars	and	pharmaceuticals.	Another	exception	from	the	
SCT	was	the	ten-year	transitional	period	granted	for	Kazakh	sugar	factories,	
which	received	consent	for	duty-free	import	of	raw	material	for	the	production	
of	cane	sugar.	It	was	also	agreed	that	the	import	of	technological	machinery	
and	equipment	for	investment	purposes	(used	for	the	modernisation	of	the	top	
priority	sectors)	would	also	be	exempted	from	customs	duty.	
Pursuant	 to	 the	 agreement	 setting	 the	 rules	 for	 the	distribution	of	 incomes	
from	import	duties	(taxes	and	other	levies)	between	the	member	states	of	the	
Customs	Union,	87.97%	of	the	incomes	will	go	to	the	Russian	budget,	7.33%	to	
the	budget	of	Kazakhstan	and	4.7%	to	the	budget	of	Belarus.	
Although	 the	exceptions	which	are	not	 covered	by	 the	 single	 customs	 tariff	
form	a	rather	limited	number	of	product	groups	(120	in	2012	and	400	in	2010,	
out	of	a	total	number	of	several	thousand),	they	concern	products	which	are	
important	for	each	given	country.	Usually,	these	countries	are	dependent	on	
imports	of	such	goods,	because	they	manufacture	them	either	not	at	all	or	in	
insufficient	 quantities.	 However,	 a	 decidedly	more	 important	 limitation	 for	
the	common	trade	policy	between	the	three	states	 is	 the	fact	 that	 the	single	
customs	tariff	does	not	apply	in	the	case	of	export duties, which	are	usually	
5	 http://tsouz.ru/db/ettr/Pages/Perehodny.aspx
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imposed	on	mineral	resources	–	the	key	export	products	of	these	countries6.	
Export	duty	is	most	frequently	used	by	Russia.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	ex-
port	duty	poses	a	barrier	to	internal	trade	between	the	three	member	states	
of	the	Customs	Union	as	well.	For	instance,	Moscow	imposes	it	on	those	crude	
oil	supplies	 to	Belarus	which	are	not	 intended	for	 the	needs	of	 this	country.	
Since	2012,	only	oil	supplied	via	pipelines	to	the	Customs	Union	member	states	
is	duty-free	 (customs	duty	 should	be	 imposed	on	oil	 transported	by	 railway	
cisterns).	Furthermore,	Russia	has	promised	to	impose	customs	duty	on	all	oil	
sent	to	Kazakhstan	starting	from	2014.	
The	entry	into	force	of	the	common customs code (CCC)	in	all	three	mem-
ber	states	has	been	of	key	significance	for	the	operation	of	the	Customs	Un-
ion.	This	document	set	the	same	rules	for	the	member	states	regarding	the	
imposition	 of	 customs	 duty,	 extra-tariff	 regulations,	 customs	 inspection	
and	all	procedures	linked	to	import,	export	and	transport	of	goods.	The	CCC	
was	based	on	the	International	Convention	on	the	Simplification	and	Har-
monisation	of	Customs	Procedures	(signed	in	Kyoto	in	1973)	and	the	WTO’s	
requirements.	This	document	introduced	facilitations	in	customs	clearance	
of	 goods	 supplied	 from	outside	 the	Customs	Union,	 reduced	 the	 clearance	
time	and	the	number	of	required	documents.	When	the	CCC	started	to	apply	
in	 internal	 trade	 inside	 the	Customs	Union,	 customs	 clearance	was	 lifted	
in	the	case	of	goods	originating	from	CU	member	states,	or	third	countries	
if	the	goods	were	cleared	by	the	customs	services	of	any	of	the	CU	member	
states.	Furthermore,	customs	 inspection	points	were	withdrawn	from	the	
internal	borders	of	the	CU.	They	were	liquidated	on	the	Russia/Belarus	bor-
der	on	1	January	20117,	and	half	a	year	later	(on	1	July	2011)	on	the	Kazakh-
stan/Russia	border.	
The	CCC	also	introduced	a	single	customs	declaration	used	by	all	three	states,	
a	customs	value	declaration,	and	instructions	for	completing	these	documents.	
Since	the	CCC	was	being	developed	at	a	fast	pace,	it	was	impossible	to	negotiate	
all	the	necessary	details.	As	a	result,	the	document	includes	many	references	
6	 The	share	of	incomes	from	sale	of	mineral	resources	(oil	and	petroleum	products,	natural	
gas,	metal	and	metal	products,	and	fertilisers)	 is	approximately	80%	of	Russian	exports,	
over	85%	in	Kazakh	exports	and	less	than	65%	in	Belarusian	exports.	
7	 However,	according	to	Belarusian	press	reports,	Russian	customs	officers	returned	to	the	
Russian-Belarusian	 border	 checkpoint	 in	 Smolensk	 oblast	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 2012.	 The	
Russian	side	claims	that	the	customs	officers	are	not	working	at	the	border	checkpoint	but	
only	in	the	customs	inspection	zone,	which	is	located	at	the	border.	For	more,	see:	http://
belaruspartisan.org/economic/215904/	
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to	the	national	regulations	of	the	countries	involved	in	the	integration	process.	
The	parties	also	failed	to	develop	all	the	necessary	executive	acts.	As	a	result,	
differences	in	some	customs	procedures	used	by	each	of	the	three	states	have	
remained.	One	example	may	be	the	rules	of	functioning	and	the	procedure	for	
granting	Authorised	 Economic	Operator	 (AEO)	 status.	 Such	 entities	 had	 al-
ready	been	present	on	the	Belarusian	and	Kazakh	markets,	but	Russia	needed	
to	develop	a	new	law,	which	was	enacted	as	late	as	November	2010,	and	took	
the	form	of	the	Customs	Regulations	Act	(four	months	after	the	introduction	of	
the	Customs	Code).	
The	integrative	actions	taken	by	Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus	enabled	them	
to	set	up	the	Customs	Union.	However,	its	operation	is	restricted	to	import	pol-
icy.	Energy	resources,	which	are	of	key	significance	for	these	countries’	trade	
(with	export	shares	of	80%	in	Kazakhstan,	70%	in	Russia	and	30%	in	Belarus),	
have	been	excluded	from	the	integration	process.	It	was	Russia’s	decision	to	re-
linquish	the	harmonisation	of	export	duties;	this	revealed	its	lack	of	readiness	
to	share	(at	least	formally)	its	competences,	which	guarantee	around	30%	of	its	
budget	intakes.	
Additionally,	the	co-operation	rules	dictated	by	Moscow	(especially	the	single	
import	 tariff),	which	 strengthened	 the	 protectionist	 policy	 applied	 towards	
third	countries,	proved	to	be	unfavourable	for	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus,	caused	
an	increase	in	the	prices	of	third-party	goods,	and	thus	contributed	to	improv-
ing	the	price	competitiveness	of	goods	from	Russia,	despite	their	poor	quality.	
The	efficient	operation	of	the	Customs	Union	was	furthermore	impaired	by	the	
inconsistent	and	ambiguous	Common	Customs	Code,	which	leaves	room	for	free	
interpretation	of	its	provisions	to	each	of	the	customs	services.	The	amendments	
made	to	this	document	only	partly	improved	its	effectiveness.	As	a	consequence,	
work	commenced	on	a	new	document	which	would	be	more	precise	and	reduce	
to	a	minimum	the	possibility	of	introducing	any	national	solutions8.
Nevertheless,	 the	 adjustment	 of	 the	 Customs	 Union’s	 rules	 to	 those	 applicable	
in	the	WTO,	which	Russia	undertook	to	adhere	to	as	a	member	of	this	organisa-
tion,	has	been	a	positive	factor.	As	a	consequence,	both	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus,	
which	are	formally	outside	the	WTO	structures,	have	been	forced	to	adopt	the	ter-
minology	and	the	customs	procedures	which	apply	in	the	WTO	member	states.	
8	 Министр таможенного сотрудничества ЕЭК Владимир Гошин: „Кто виноват? Таможня”,	
11	July	2012,	РБК daily.
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2.2. The formation of the common economic space
Although	the	Common	Economic	Space	formally	began	to	operate	on	1	January	
2012,	most	of	the	executive	acts	necessary	for	the	structure	to	meet	its	assump-
tions	have	not	yet	been	agreed	on.	Work	on	the	required	documents	and	the	
implementation	thereof	have	been	divided	into	stages	according	to	the	sched-
ule9	for	implementing	the	agreements	setting	up	the	CES	which	was	adopted	in	
April	2012.	The	greater	part	of	the	work	is	expected	to	have	been	finalised	by	
201510,	although	in	some	cases	the	transition	periods	could	even	be	extended	to	
2020.	Pursuant	to	the	agreements	on	the	CES	adopted	and	the	executive	acts	
already	developed	to	some	of	them,	the	parties	have	set	the	rules	of	integration	
in	several	areas11.
economic policy,	including:
•	 macroeconomic policy guidelines, partly	 by	 determining	 the	 conver-
gence	criteria	(modelled	on	the	EU’s	Maastricht	criteria):	the	budget	deficit	
of	the	CES	member	states	may	not	exceed	3%	of	GDP,	the	public	debt	may	
not	be	higher	than	50%	of	GDP,	and	the	inflation	rate	may	not	be	more	than	
5	percentage	points	above	 the	price	 level	 in	 the	member	state	where	 the	
inflation	is	lowest.	Officially,	these	parameters	becomes	binding	in	2013,	al-
though	all	three	countries	had	already	met	these	conditions	in	2011;	
•	 the operation and access to the services provided by selected natural 
monopolies, albeit	with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 gas	market,	which	will	 be	
regulated	under	a	separate	agreement.	The	parties	announced	they	would	
adjust	their	terminology	and	legislation	in	order	to	create	the	principles	for	
common	monopoly	regulation,	while	maintaining	the	national	regulators;	
and	grant	entities	from	the	CES	non-discriminatory	access	to	the	services	
provided	by	monopoly	firms.	The	 schedule	 for	 the	 step-by-step	 develop-
ment	of	common	rules	regulating	 the	operation	of	natural	monopolies	 is	
expected	to	be	ready	by	March	201412;	
9	 http://www.tks.ru/news/law/2012/05/04/0001	
10	 ‘YEP	udastsa	sformirovat	v	blizhaishiye	polgoda,	zayavil	Lukashenko’,	RIA Novosti,	9	Decem	-	
ber	2010.
11	 Presentation	by	the	Ministry	of	Economic	Development	of	the	Russian	Federation.	
12	 Решение Коллегии Евразийской экономической комиссии от 5 февраля 2013 г. N 14 
„О реа лизации Соглашения о единых принципах и правилах регулирования деятель-
ности субъектов естественных монополий от 9 декабря 2010 года”,	http://www.alta.ru/
show_orders.php?action=view&filename=13kr0014#ANCHOR_A01	
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•	 competition policy:	the	parties	have	promised	to	harmonise	their	legisla-
tion	and	to	transfer	the	management	and	audit	(including	punishments	in	
case	of	breach)	to	a	supranational	anti-trust	agency.	The	documents	which	
determine	such	issues	as	the	methodology	of	evaluation	of	market	competi-
tion,	considering	breach	reports,	assessing	the	penalties	and	the	manner	of	
enforcement	thereof,	were	adopted	in	November	2012;
•	 government subsidies for industry and agriculture:	 the	parties	have	
divided	the	industrial	subsidies	into	three	types:	specific	(these	are	admis-
sible,	 unless	 they	 are	 prejudicial	 to	 any	 partners	 from	 the	 CES),	 forbid-
den	(the	introduction	of	which	enables	the	partners	to	use	compensation	
mechanisms)	and	admissible	(horizontal,	for	instance	concerning	support	
for	 small-	and	medium-sized	businesses	or	very	poor	 regions).	The	com-
mon	criteria	for	granting	the	right	to	subsidies	and	evaluation	of	their	use	
will	be	agreed	by	2015.	The	supranational	agency	will	receive	the	right	to	
decide	whether	these	can	be	used	by	that	time,	as	well.	As	regards	support	
for	agriculture,	for	example,	the	parties	have	agreed	that	export	subsidies	
will	be	forbidden,	while	any	support	which	does	not	affect	trade	can	be	of-
fered	without	any	 limitations.	The	value	of	 subsidies	 affecting	 trade	has	
been	restricted	to	10%	of	the	net	value	of	agricultural	production.	The	deci-
sion	on	how	to	report	on	the	subsidies	used	was	passed	in	November	2011.	
The	participating	states	thus	undertook	to	adjust	their	national	laws	to	the	
community	rules	(a	transitional	period	until	2016	was	introduced	for	Bela-
rus;	it	will	gradually	reduce	the	value	of	its	subsidies	from	16%	in	2011	to	the	
agreed	level	of	10%);	
•	 public procurement at local level:	it	has	been	agreed	that	entities	from	
all	CES	member	states	will	be	given	equal	access,	and	that	the	procure-
ment	rules,	the	way	information	on	purchase	plans	is	presented,	and	the	
requirements	 for	procurement	 in	electronic	form	will	be	harmonised.	
The	parties	have	agreed	that	 in	exceptional	situations	it	will	be	possi-
ble	 to	 derogate	 from	 these	 rules	 for	 a	 period	 not	 longer	 than	 2	 years.	
National	 rules	 are	 expected	 to	 apply	 to	 entities	 from	other	CES	 coun-
tries	 (operation	 on	 the	 same	 conditions	 as	 domestic	 companies)	 from	
1	January	2014;	
•	 the service sale and investment policy rules:	 the	 CES	member	 states	
have	agreed	that	they	will	aim	to	offer	their	partners	access	to	the	services	
market	according	to	the	national	rules;	the	exceptions	will	be	audiovisual	
services,	air	transport,	banking	services,	postal	services,	inland	water	and	
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maritime	 transport,	and	pipeline	 transport13.	Foreign	 investors’	 share	 in	
the	telecommunication	services	and	air	transport	sectors	has	been	restrict-
ed	to	49%	of	the	market,	and	their	share	in	the	mass	media	to	20%.	Nor	will	
the	market	 for	 lawyer	or	notary	services	be	subject	 to	 integration	 (those	
who	offer	such	services	must	be	citizens	of	a	given	country).	Furthermore,	
each	of	the	states	can	also	lengthen	the	list	of	exceptions	individually;	
•	 the rules of intellectual property protection:	the	rules	being	introduced	
must	 comply	with	 the	 international	 commitments	 of	 the	 states	 involved	
in	the	integration	process.	The	parties	have	also	set	general	rules	for	the	
standardisation	of	copyright,	trademarks,	names	of	the	places	of	origin	of	
goods,	and	patent	rights.	It	is	planned	to	create	a	common	system	for	the	
protection	of	intellectual	property	rights,	and	to	establish	a	coordinating	
authority	on	the	CES	level.	It	was	agreed	that	the	acts	enabling	the	use	of	
these	rules	would	be	developed	by	the	end	of	2012,	but	this	deadline	was	
not	met.	
The free movement of capital and the common currency policy
The	 parties	 have	 promised	 to	 harmonise	 their	 laws,	 requirements,	 market	
management	regulations		and	the	protection	of	consumer	rights	on	the	bank-
ing,	insurance	and	securities	markets.	They	have	also	declared	their	support	
for	guaranteeing	the	transparency	of	their	markets’	operation.	The	harmoni-
sation	is	expected	to	be	completed	by	the	end	of	2013.	As	regards	the	common	
currency	policy,	the	parties	have	undertaken	to	coordinate	the	exchange	rate	
policy	and	currency	repatriation	requirements,	to	introduce	standardised	ter-
minology,	to	unify	the	import	and	export	of	currency,	to	harmonise	the	stand-
ards	and	rules	of	currency	adjustment,	and	to	coordinate	currency	control.	The	
regulations	for	the	export	and	import	of	currency	were	unified	on	1	July	2010.	
Furthermore,	 in	November	2011,	 the	central	banks	made	arrangements	con-
cerning	currency	policy	coordination,	and	an	agreement	on	the	co-operation	
of	agencies	in	charge	of	currency	audits	was	signed.	Although	the	documents	
include	no	declaration	on	 the	 introduction	of	a	 single	currency,	 the	Russian	
side	has	recently	been	fostering	this	idea14.
13	 http://www.wto.kz/index.php?r=2&p=264
14	 At	the	Saint	Petersburg	economic	forum	on	15	June	2012,	Prime	Minister	Dmitri	Medvedev	
suggested	that	a	single	currency	could	be	introduced	in	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union.	This	
idea	was	also	backed	by	the	Russian	Parliamentary	Commission	for	the	CES.	
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energy and transport policy
These	arrangements	were	to	result	in	free	trade	in	oil	and	petroleum	prod-
ucts,	the	non-imposition	of	export	duties	inside	the	CES	(this	rule	started	to	
apply	when	Russia	signed	bilateral	agreements	with	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	
on	settling	their	accounts	regarding	the	mutual	re-export	of	oil15).	Equal	non-
discriminatory	access	to	the	transport	system	for	entities	from	all	CES	mem-
ber	states,	common	conditions	for	setting	transport	tariffs,	and	the	unifica-
tion	of	the	standards	and	norms	concerning	petroleum	products	have	been	
promised	 by	 the	 parties.	A	 decision	 of	August	 2011	 imposed	 the	 obligation	
upon	the	parties	to	inform	each	other	of	the	export	and	import	of	petroleum	
products.	The	parties	also	agreed	that	petrol	and	diesel	oil	requirements	and	
standards	will	be	 implemented	as	of	 201316.	As	 regards	 co-operation	 in	 the	
railway	sector,	they	have	agreed	to	harmonise	the	rules	for	setting	railway	
tariffs,	which	is	expected	to	be	done	in	2013.	Unrestricted	access	to	services	
is	to	be	ensured	for	entities	from	all	CES	member	states	in	2015.	However,	the	
common	access	and	service	provision	rules	need	to	be	agreed	first,	originally	
planned	by	 the	 end	of	 2012.	The	parties’	 arrangements	 concerning	 the	gas	
sector	signify	that	only	the	procedure	for	determining	the	gas	price	will	be	
established.	Access	to	the	transport	network	is	expected	to	be	ensured	only	
upon	meeting	numerous	 conditions,	 or	bringing	 the	gas	prices	 on	 the	CES	
market	closer	to	the	free	market	levels	(i.e.	a	price	level	comparable	to	that	
offered	to	Europe,	minus	transport	costs	and	export	duty).	It	is	assumed	that	
this	will	take	place	in	2015.	
The free movement of labour
The	parties	have	decided	to	join	efforts	to	counteract	illegal	migration	of	work-
ers	from	third	countries	and	to	determine	the	legal	status	of	expatriate	workers	
15	 For	example,	 the	Russian	export	duty	rate	 is	 imposed	on	Russian	oil	 re-exported	by	Ka-
zakhstan,	and	is	then	transferred	to	the	Russian	budget.	If	oil	from	Kazakhstan	is	re-ex-
ported	by	Russia,	the	customs	duties	go	to	Kazakhstan’s	budget.	
16	 A	three-year	transition	period	was	introduced	in	the	case	of	the	adopted	technical	regulation	
on	the	requirements	concerning	petrol	and	diesel	oil,	which	will	take	effect	in	2013.	Regula-
tions	introducing	the	Euro-4	and	Euro-5	emission	reduction	standards,	which	are	new	in	this	
region,	are	expected	to	take	effect	in	Russia	and	Belarus	in	January	2015,	and	in	Kazakhstan	
one	year	later.	Fuels	supplied	as	part	of	orders	from	the	defence	sector,	exported	outside	the	
CU,	those	used	as	reserves	and	those	used	in	the	oil	industry	have	been	excluded	from	these	
regulations.	 For	 Belarus,	 whose	 refineries	 have	 already	 been	modernised,	 meeting	 these	
standards	will	be	the	easiest	task.	However	Kazakhstan,	which	is	just	planning	to	modernise	
its	oil	refining	sector,	will	find	it	most	difficult	to	implement	these	standards.	
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and	members	of	their	families.	In	December	2010,	CES	member	states	reached	
an	agreement	on	the	legal	status	of	expatriate	workers	and	on	counteracting	
illegal	immigration.	Owing	to	this	citizens	of	the	three	states	can	be	employed	
within	CES,	regardless	of	their	origin,	without	any	restrictions	or	the	need	to	
apply	for	special	permits17.	The	labour	market	protection	mechanisms	do	not	
apply	to	workers	from	CES.	For	example,	workers	from	Belarus	and	Kazakh-
stan	are	not	included	in	the	quotas	of	foreigners	who	can	be	employed	on	the	
basis	of	a	permit.	
Technical standards	
As	agreed	between	the	CU’s	parties	at	the	end	of	2010,	the	community’s	techni-
cal	standards18	based	on	international	standards,	including	those	applicable	in	
the	WTO,	should	be	the	only	binding	standards	for	these	countries	as	of	1	Janu-
ary	2012	(the	national	requirements	should	be	lifted).	Common	sanitary	and	
epidemiological	requirements	were	already	adopted	for	goods	subject	to	this	
kind	of	supervision	as	part	of	the	Customs	Union	in	mid-201019.	These	stand-
ards	were	also	harmonised	with	Russia’s	commitments	to	the	WTO.	A	common	
list	of	production	types	subject	to	technical	regulations	was	adopted	in	January	
2011.	The	present	version	of	the	list,	which	was	supplemented	under	a	decision	
by	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission	Council	of	22	November	2012,	consists	
of	66	items20,	including	machinery	and	equipment,	grain,	children’s	toys	and	
food.	 In	April	 2011,	 the	parties	 further	agreed	on	 the	procedures	 to	 confirm	
compliance	 with	 the	 requirements.	 Additionally,	 agencies	 from	 individual	
countries	were	put	in	charge	of	the	technical	regulation	issues21.	A	register	of	
laboratories	authorised	to	certify	goods	and	admit	them	to	trade	in	all	three	
countries	was	also	approved	at	the	beginning	of	2011.	Standardised	certificate	
and	 declaration	 registration	 forms	were	 introduced	 within	 the	 CU	 in	mid-
2011.	31	technical	regulations	(out	of	the	66	needed)	took	effect	by	April	2013.	
The	effective	dates	of	 the	 remaining	ones	have	been	postponed	until	 as	 late	
17	 W.	Ioncew...,	Yedinyi	rynok	truda	YeEP:	ekonomicheskyi	efekt	soglashenyi	v	oblasti	 tru-
dovoi	 migratsii.	 Eurasian	 Development	 Bank,	 Евразийская экономическая интеграция,	
no.	2	(15)	2012.
18	 Exceptions	to	 the	community	standards	could	only	be	made	for	geographical	or	climatic	
reasons.	For	example,	Russia	has	not	decided	to	impose	a	ban	on	using	cars	with	the	steer-
ing	wheel	on	the	right-hand	side.
19	 http://tsouz.ru/KTS/KTS17/Pages/P2_299.aspx
20	 http://www.tsouz.ru/db/techreglam/Documents/Ed%20perech%20new.pdf	
21	 http://www.tsouz.ru/db/techregulation/techbars/Pages/default.aspx#
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as	1	January	201522.	The	regulations	which	have	already	been	developed	cover	
railway	transport	safety	(in	force),	food	production	(as	of	1	January	2013),	ma-
chinery	and	equipment	(as	of	15	February	2012)	and	petrol	&	diesel	oil	require-
ments	(1	January	2013),	among	others23.	In	the	case	of	goods	for	which	common	
standards	have	not	been	developed,	the	national	standards	in	force	hitherto	
still	apply.	
As	a	result	of	the	changes	which	have	been	taking	place	within	the	CES,	the	
process	of	introducing	the	free	movement	of	labour	between	Russia,	Kazakh-
stan	 and	Belarus	 is	 the	most	 advanced.	Even	before	 the	present	 integration	
structures	were	created,	these	countries	had	offered	numerous	mutual	travel	
facilitations	to	their	citizens,	such	as	visa-free	movement	for	citizens	holding	
both	internal	passports	(identity	cards)	and	foreign	passports.	The	integration	
process	has	also	offered	citizens	of	Kazakhstan24	access to the labour market 
in	the	CES.	At	present,	citizens	of	all	three	countries	need	not	apply	for	spe-
cial	work	permits,	and	workers	from	CES	member	states	should	be	treated	as	
the	domestic	workforce	is.	Furthermore,	the	registration	obligation	has	been	
lifted	from	both	expatriate	workers	and	members	of	their	families,	if	their	stay	
is	shorter	than	30	days25.
However,	it	has	been	impossible	so	far	to	introduce	the	free movement of goods. 
Although	most	tariff	barriers	have	been	lifted,	many	other	barriers	are	still	re-
stricting	trade.	The	most	serious	restrictions	include	the	continuing	differences	
in	technical	requirements	and	the	failure	to	comply	with	the	agreed	rules26.
Progress	 in	 introducing	the	free movement of capital has	also	been	rather	
modest.	The	main	stage	of	harmonising	laws	regulating	the	banking,	currency,	
securities	and	insurance	markets,	including	requirements	for	licensing	opera-
tion	in	these	sectors,	is	to	begin	by	the	end	of	2013.	The	entire	process	is	expect-
ed	to	be	completed	by	as	late	as	2020.	It	is	also	likely	that	further	restrictions	
22	 For	a	complete	list	of	regulations	see:	http://www.tsouz.ru/db/techreglam/Pages/tecnical-
reglament.aspx
23	 See	footnote	16.	
24	 The	free	movement	of	labour	also	existed	before,	as	part	of	the	Union	State	of	Russia	and	
Belarus.	
25	 W.	Ioncew...,	Yedinyi	rynok	truda	YeEP:	ekonomicheskyi	efekt	soglashenyi	v	oblasti	trudo-
voi	migratsii,	op.cit. 
26	 Epidemiological	and	sanitary	standards	which	did	not	fully	meet	the	community	require-
ments	still	applied	in	Russia	in	the	first	half	of	2012.	For	more,	see:	http://www.a4consult-
ing.ru/articles/1728-edinye-sanitarnye-trebovaniya-tamozhennogo-soyuza.html
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will	be	imposed	on	foreign	investors’	access	to	the	financial	markets	in	indi-
vidual	CES	member	states.	As	part	of	 its	negotiations	with	 the	WTO,	Russia	
has	been	given	guarantees	that	the	share	of	foreign	capital	in	the	banking	and	
insurance	sectors	will	not	exceed	50%.	Belarus	also	strictly	regulates	the	pres-
ence	of	 foreign	entities	on	its	market.	Only	Kazakhstan	has	no	such	restric-
tions;	however,	its	government	has	began	to	consider	the	possibility	of	impos-
ing	some	of	them.	
Limited	progress	can	also	be	observed	in	the	introduction	of	the	free move-
ment of services. The	national	regulations	of	the	state	in	which	the	service	is	
provided	still	apply27.	The	services	sector	became	part	of	the	integration	pro-
cess	only	within	the	framework	of	the	CES.	Before	that,	this	market	segment	
had	been	developing	autonomously	in	each	of	the	countries.	
However,	it	turns	out	that	the	introduction	of	the	‘four	freedoms’,	especially	
the	free	movement	of	labour	and	goods,	could	also	have	negative	consequences	
for	Kazakhstan’s	plans	for	developing	its	local	economy.	Kazakhstan’s	govern-
ment	insists	that	local	workforce	and	goods	must	be	used	to	the	broadest	pos-
sible	extent	as	part	of	investment,	energy	and	infrastructural	projects.	Mean-
while,	investors	in	an	increasing	number	of	cases	are	also	including	Russian	
workers	and	goods	in	the	pool	of	orders	reserved	for	Kazakh	businesses	and	
employees.	
2.3. The authorities in charge of operation of the integration 
structures 
It	has	been	agreed	that	the	responsibility	for	the	integration	process	rests	with	
the	newly	established	authorities	of	the	Customs	Union	and	the	Common	Eco-
nomic	Space.	Their	tasks	include	administering	and	supervising	the	integra-
tion	process	(including	monitoring	the	implementation	of	the	decisions	adopt-
ed,	and	developing	legal	acts	to	enable	deeper	integration).	It	is	worth	noting	
that	some	of	these	authorities	were	established	after	the	Eurasian	Economic	
Community	had	been	 formed,	which	raises	doubts	about	 the	distribution	of	
competences.	
27	 When	the	Customs	Union	was	being	formed,	service	sale	issues	were	not	raised,	and	no	spe-
cial	regulations	in	this	sector	were	introduced.	The	lack	of	a	common	policy	regarding	the	
services	sector	in	the	CU	was	one	of	the	impediments	which	prevented	Russia,	Kazakhstan	
and	Belarus	from	jointly	embarking	upon	accession	negotiations	with	the	World	Trade	Or-
ganisation	in	2009.	Regulations	concerning	the	services	sector	are	an	essential	part	of	the	
WTO’s	acquis. 
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The	most	important	political	body	of	the	integrating	structures	is	the	supreme 
eurasian economic council, which	meets	annually	at	the	presidential	level	
and	at	least	twice	a	year	at	the	government	heads’	level.	The	council	meets	in	
the	format	of	five	states:	Russia,	Kazakhstan,	Belarus,	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajiki-
stan.	However,	decisions	regarding	the	CU	and	the	CES	are	taken	only	by	the	
three	 countries	 involved	 in	 the	 integration	 process.	 The	 council	 decides	 on	
strategic	co-operation	directions	by	consensus.	Individual	states	may	appeal	to	
the	council	if	they	do	not	agree	with	the	conditions	or	methods	of	integration.	
The	eurasian economic commission	(EEC)	operating	in	Moscow	is	a	perma-
nent	regulatory	body	of	the	Customs	Union	and	the	emerging	Common	Eco-
nomic	 Space28.	 This	 commission	 replaced	 the	 previously	 operating	 Customs	
Union	Commission	 and	 took	 over	 its	 competences	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 2012.	
The	EEC	consists	of	the	Council	and	the	Board.	The	council,	a	political	body,	is	
formed	by	three	deputy	prime	ministers	(one	from	each	state)29,	who	supervise	
the	Commission’s	work	and	decide	on	the	general	directions	of	its	operation.	
The	Council	of	the	Commission	passes	decisions	which	are	within	the	preroga-
tives	of	the	EEC	(currently	predominantly	concerning	the	tariff	and	customs	
policy	and	standardisation)	by	consensus.	If	the	parties	are	unable	to	reach	the	
consensus,	the	issue	is	passed,	to	be	resolved	later	by	the	Supreme	Eurasian	
Economic	Commission.	
In	turn,	the	board is	the	Commission’s	executive	body	(it	has	been	modelled	on	
the	EU’s	European	Commission),	and	consists	of	nine	members:	three	repre-
sentatives	(commissioners)	from	each	state,	who	are	appointed	for	four	years.	
The	Board’s	tasks	include	direct	management	of	operation	of	the	bureaucracy	
of	the	Customs	Union	and	the	Common	Economic	Space,	which	is	divided	into	
23	departments.	Since	2012,	 the	EEC’s	competences	are	primarily	as	 follows:	
administering	and	adjusting	 the	 tariff	&	customs	policy,	developing	and	su-
pervising	 compliance	with	 technical,	 sanitary	&	phytosanitary	 regulations,	
distribution	of	the	income	from	customs	duty,	and	setting	the	rules	of	trade	
co-operation	 with	 third	 countries	 (all	 these	 functions	 had	 previously	 been	
performed	 by	 the	 Customs	 Union	 Commission).	 As	 integration	 of	 the	 three	
states	deepens,	the	Commission’s	competences	will	be	gradually	expanded,	to	
28	 Agreement	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission	of	18	November	2011;	http://www.tsouz.
ru/Docs/IntAgrmnts/Pages/Perechen_MDTS.aspx,	 regulations	 of	 its	 operation;	 http://
www.tks.ru/files/other/reglament-ek.pdf	
29	 In	2012,	the	Council	consisted	of	Igor	Shuvalov	from	Russia,	Kairad	Kalimbetov	from	Ka-
zakhstan	and	Siarhey	Rumas	from	Belarus.
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include	for	example	co-deciding	on	the	anti-trust,	currency,	macroeconomic,	
energy	 and	 competition	 policies;	 regulations	 concerning	 government	 subsi-
dies	for	industry	and	agriculture;	public	procurement,	transport	and	migra-
tion.	The	scope	of	the	Commission’s	competences	will	depend	on	the	degree	of	
these	states’	real	integration.	The	Commission	has	the	right	to	represent	the	
member	states	of	the	Customs	Union	and	to	hold	international	negotiations.	
Pursuant	to	the	regulations,	the	Board	passes	decisions	by	a	qualified	majority	
of	two-thirds	of	the	votes.	Each	state	and	the	Council	of	the	Commission	can	
contest	the	Board’s	decisions	at	the	Supreme	Eurasian	Economic	Commission.	
Decisions	which	have	been	finally	accepted	by	 the	Commission	 (the	Council	
and	the	Board)30	directly	become	part	of	the	legal	base	of	the	CU	and	the	CES,	
and	do	not	have	to	be	ratified.	The	national	state	authorities	are	in	charge	of	
implementing	these	decisions31.
The	number	of	officials	employed	by	the	Commission	 is	constantly	growing.	
One	thousand	people	have	been	working	there	since	January	2013.	84%	of	them	
are	citizens	of	Russia,	 10%	are	citizens	of	Kazakhstan	and	6%	are	citizens	of	
Belarus.	The	members	 of	 the	Commission	 (both	 the	Council	 and	 the	Board)	
have	also	been	granted	immunity	and	federal	minister	status32.	The	Commis-
sion’s	budget	will	be	formulated	by	the	states	in	proportion	to	their	respective	
shares	in	incomes	from	import	duties	in	the	CU	(Russia	accounts	for	87.97%).
Officially,	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission	was	formed	on	1	January	2012,	
but	it	started	de facto	operation	on	2	February	2012,	when	Viktor	Khristenko	
was	appointed	head	of	the	Board	(so-far	deputy	prime	minister	in	the	Russian	
Federation).	The	predecessor	of	the	EEC,	the	Customs	Union	Commission,	fi-
nally	ceased	formal	operation	as	late	as	1	July	2012.	
30	 To	become	effective,	decisions	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission	must	be	published	on	
the	Commission’s	website.	However,	the	site	was	only	created	on	1	July	2012;	before	then,	
decisions	were	published	on	the	Customs	Union	Commission’s	website.	
31	 The	Agreement	on	the	Customs	Union	Commission	of	7	October	2010	ceased	to	be	binding	
on	2	February	2012.	The	Agreement	on	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission	of	18	November	
2011	 came	 into	 force	 on	 2	 February	 2012.	 http://www.tsouz.ru/Docs/IntAgrmnts/Pages/
Perechen_MDTS.aspx
32	 The	immunity	granted	can	be	rescinded	by	the	Commission	itself.	Other	privileges	include	
a	45-day	holiday	 leave,	coverage	of	social,	accommodation	and	medical	costs,	and	wages	at	
ministerial	level.	The	Commission’s	work	will	be	financed	from	the	budgets	of	the	states	in-
volved	in	the	integration	process:	87.97%	by	Russia,	7.33%	by	Kazakhstan	and	4.7%	by	Belarus.	
In	2011,	the	Customs	Union	Commission’s	budget	was	worth	437	million	roubles;	in	2012,	the	
budget	of	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission	rose	to	approximately	4.8	billion	roubles.
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The	court of the eurasian economic community	(operating	in	Minsk)	is	in	
charge	of	resolving	economic	disputes	and	handling	the	issues	of	the	parties’	
compliance	with	the	agreements	signed.	This	body	has	been	in	operation	since	
January	2012.	It	consists	of	ten	judges:	two	representatives	of	each	of	the	states.	
Disputes	within	 the	Customs	Union	 and	 the	CES	 are	 resolved	 by	 the	 judges	
representing	 the	member	 states	of	 these	organisations.	The	first	 instance	 is	
formed	by	a	board	of	three	judges;	appeals	can	be	addressed	to	the	remaining	
three	judges.	The	court’s	verdicts	are	binding	upon	the	member	states.	
The	establishment	of	a	supranational	body,	and	granting	 it	 the	competences	
of	making	laws	which	are	directly	binding	upon	all	the	states	involved	in	the	
integration	process,	can	be	recognised	as	serious	achievements	by	these	states.	
At	present	this	commission	effectively	administers	tariff	&	customs	issues	as	
well	as	the	process	of	harmonising	the	technical	requirements.	However,	on	
the	other	hand,	the	fact	that	Russian	officials	predominate	in	the	Commission	
gives	rise	to	the	risk	that	the	integration	process	will	be	subordinated	exclu-
sively	to	Russian	interests.	Furthermore,	the	Commission’s	effectiveness	has	
been	hampered	due	to	its	limited	competences	and	the	need	to	compete	with	
the	national	ministries	and	services,	which	are	only	reluctantly	relinquishing	
their	previous	rights.	
26
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
13
II. The basIc InTeresTs of The presenT  
and poTenTIal parTIcIpanTs In The InTegraTIon 
process
The	countries	 in	 the	 region	have	an	ambivalent	attitude	 to	Vladimir	Putin’s	
integrationist	ideas.	On	one	hand,	closer	economic	bonds	offer	opportunities	
for	growing	trade	and	economic	development;	but	on	the	other,	 the	political	
project	being	pushed	through	by	Moscow	and	rapidly	implemented	is	giving	
rise	to	fears	that	the	CES	region	could	become	totally	dominated	by	Russia.	
1. regional integration: russian interests vs. those of selected 
countries in the region
1.1. russian interests
russia’s decision	to	embark	upon	regional	integration	has	been	motivated	pri-
marily	by	political	factors,	and	not	by	its	economic	needs.	
Regional	integration	had	been	one	of	the	strategic interests in	Russian	for-
eign	policy	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR.	However,	it	was	only	in	2009	that	the	
Russian	administration,	closely	supervised	by	Vladimir	Putin,	embarked	upon	
real	formation	of	the	community	structures.	Closer	co-operation	was	intended	
to	enable	the	achievement	of	both	regional	and	global	goals.	Regional	integra-
tion	became	an	area	of	competition	between	Moscow	and	the	European	Union	
for	influence	in	Ukraine,	Belarus,	Moldova,	Armenia,	Azerbaijan	and	Georgia.	
Over	the	past	few	years	these	countries	have	been	co-operating	increasingly	
closely	with	Brussels33	in	an	attempt	to	modernise	their	economies	and	reduce	
their	dependence	on	Russia.	From	Moscow’s	point	of	view,	regional	 integra-
tion	was	intended	to	counteract	the	economic	expansion	of	the	third	countries	
and	the	loosening	of	the	bonds	between	CIS	countries	and	Russia,	while	at	the	
same	time	guaranteeing	that	Russia	maintained	its	strong	politico-economic	
influence	in	this	area,	especially	in	the	energy	sector,	which	is	a	decisive	factor	
in	the	region’s	importance	for	the	global	economy.	This	is	why	Russia,	by	mak-
ing	use	of	all	the	instruments	available	to	it,	has	been	making	efforts	to	con-
vince	selected	CIS	countries	–	especially	Ukraine,	the	region’s	second	largest	
33	 For	 example	 by	 negotiating	Association	Agreements	with	 the	 EU,	 one	 element	 of	which	
is	the	Deep	and	Comprehensive	Free	Trade	Area	agreement	with	the	EU.	Ukraine	already	
initialled	 such	an	agreement	 in	2012.	Furthermore,	negotiations	with	Moldova,	Georgia,	
Armenia	and	Azerbaijan	have	been	set	on	track.	
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economy	–	to	join	the	regional	integration	structures.	For	example,	during	the	
summit	 of	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 Eurasian	 Economic	 Community	 (March	 2012),	
President	Dmitri	Medvedev	warned	non-member	states	(his	words	were	main-
ly	addressed	to	Ukraine,	Armenia	and	Moldova)	that	their	remaining	outside	
this	structure	could	mean	a	great	deal	of	difficulties	for	them,	although	he	did	
not	give	any	precise	examples.	
Russia’s	determination	to	push	through	the	integration	process	is	partly	a	re-
sult	of	 the	 fact	 that	Moscow	sees	strengthening	 its	position	 in	 the	region	as	
a	way	of	increasing	its	importance	on	the	international	arena	as	well.	In	Putin’s	
opinion34,	the	combined	potential	of	the	CIS	countries	(raw	materials,	capital	
and	human	resources)	should	improve	the	area’s	competitiveness	and	attrac-
tiveness,	and	thus	also	its	role	in	the	global	economy.	In	the	future,	the	inte-
grated	CIS	area	could	establish	closer	co-operation	with	the	European	Union,	
thus	forming	a	common	economic	space	extending	from	Lisbon	to	Vladivostok.	
A	 partnership	 between	 these	 two	 integration	 structures	 would	 create	 real	
conditions	for	geopolitical	and	economic	changes	on	the	continent,	the	effects	
of	which	would	also	have	global	significance.	
Regional	integration	has	also	been	important	for	Russia	as	an	image	builder.	
It	has	been	Moscow’s	desire	to	use	the	success	of	this	process	to	demonstrate	
that	it	still	is	the	centre	of	attraction	for	CIS	countries,	and	is	capable	of	car-
rying	out	successful	initiatives	in	the	post-Soviet	area.	Russia	has	also	wanted	
to	show	that	it	is	an	independent	player	on	the	international	arena,	and	that	it	
is	able	to	build	its	own	regional	groupings,	similar	to	those	existing	in	other	
parts	of	the	globe	(the	EU,	NAFTA,	ASEAN	and	MERCOSUR).
In	 economic	 terms,	 establishing	 closer	 co-operation	 with	 Belarus	 and	 Ka-
zakhstan	has	been	of	 limited	significance	for	Russia.	 Integration	on	Russian	
terms,	including	the	need	for	Minsk	and	Astana	to	raise	import	duty	rates,	has	
undoubtedly	brought	about	a	relative	improvement	in	the	competitiveness	of	
Russian	goods	on	 this	market.	Ensuring	an	outlet	 (even	 if	a	 relatively	small	
one,	 consisting	of	 approximately	26	million	people)	 for	domestic	production	
has	been	very	important,	especially	considering	the	continuing	global	crisis.	
Integration	could	in	particular	be	beneficial	to	the	Russian	automobile	indus-
try	(given	the	high	customs	duties	imposed	on	vehicles	imported	from	third	
34	 Vladimir	Putin,	Rossiya	i	Yevropa:	ot	otmysleniya	urokov	krizisa	–	k	novoi	povestke	partnior-
stva,	Süddeutsche Zeitung,	25	November	2010;	Vladimir	Putin,	Novy	Integratsionny	proyekt	dla	
Yevrazii	–	budushcheye,	kotoroye	rozhdayetsya	segodnya, Izvestia,	2	November	2011.
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countries),	the	food	industry	(given	the	lifting	of	the	non-tariff	barriers)	and	
the	oil	refining	sector,	which	could	compete	in	quality	with	Belarusian	prod-
ucts,	and	above	all	with	the	poorly	developed	oil	refining	sector	in	Kazakhstan.	
However,	Russian	manufacturers	are	gradually	losing	their	advantage	as	Rus-
sian	commitments	to	the	WTO	are	being	fulfilled	by	restricting	the	protection-
ist	policy.	
Nevertheless,	the	economic	impact	of	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	on	the	Russian	
economy	is	quite	limited.	These	two	countries	in	aggregate	account	for	approx-
imately	7%	of	trade	and	approximately	5%	of	investments	in	Russia.	In	princi-
ple,	neither	of	them	is	able	to	offer	the	Russian	economy	any	raw	materials	or	
technologies	which	Moscow	does	not	have.	At	the	same	time,	these	countries	
are	competing	with	each	other	on	global	markets	(being	primarily	exporters	of	
raw	materials	and	low-processed	goods).	
Russia	has	been	interested	in	introducing	the	 ‘four	freedoms’	slowly	and	se-
lectively.	This	has	allowed	it	to	reduce	the	threat	posed	to	its	economy	by	the	
possibility	that	Belarus	or	Kazakhstan	could	be	used	as	an	access	window	to	
the	Russian	market.	This	has	also	allowed	 it	 to	 relocate	production	 to	 these	
countries,	since	each	of	them	has	been	conducting	a	less	protectionist	policy	
and	offered	a	more	favourable	investing	climate.	
Furthermore,	the	price	Russia	had	to	pay	for	Belarus’s	participation	in	the	in-
tegration	process	was	maintaining	the	latter’s	existing	economic	privileges	of-
fered	by	the	Russian	budget.	Minsk	has	retained	its	gas	price	privileges	and,	
partly,	its	privileges	in	oil	supplies.	It	also	continues	to	receive	massive	loans,	
which	allow	the	present	Belarusian	economic	model	to	keep	operating.	
1.2. The interests of selected countries in the region
Integration	with	Russia,	a	partner	which	dominates	the	rest	of	the	countries	
in	numerous	areas,	such	as	politics,	economy,	military	and	geography,	gives	
rise	to	both	hopes	and	fears	of	the	consequences	of	such	co-operation	in	each	
state.	The	calculation	of	the	profits	and	losses,	in	the	context	of	economic	and	
political	interests	alike,	is	of	key	significance	for	each	country’s	attitude	to	the	
Russian	initiative.	
Kazakhstan sees	 regional	 integration	 in	political	 terms.	Co-operation	with	
Russia	 is	a	 strategic	 issue	 for	Astana.	Kazakhstan	cannot,	and	has	never	al-
lowed	 itself,	 to	openly	oppose	Russian	policy.	Moscow	has	also	been	playing	
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a	key	role	in	the	country’s	political	and	economic	(in)stability	partly	due	to	Ka-
zakhstan’s	heavy	reliance	on	Russian	 transit	 routes,	especially	oil	 transport	
infrastructure.	
Kazakhstan,	which	borders	on	two	powerful	partners,	Russia	and	China,	has	
been	trying	to	keep	a	balance	between	the	two	by	not	allowing	either	of	them	
to	dominate	its	economy,	while	at	the	same	time	maximising	the	benefits	of	co-
operation	with	each	of	them	for	its	economic	development.	China’s	increased	
economic	engagement	in	Central	Asia,	including	Kazakhstan,	has	been	notable	
over	the	past	decade.	Considering	this,	Astana	could	use	deeper	economic	in-
tegration	with	Russia	as	a	means	to	protect	itself	from	Beijing’s	economic	and	
political	 expansion	 and	 to	 balance	 it	with	 co-operation	with	Russia.	 In	 this	
context,	the	Customs	Union	can	be	seen	as	a	tool	which	could	help	to	restrict	
co-operation	with	China	and	give	it	a	form	as	desired	by	Kazakhstan	(partly	
thanks	to	the	introduction	of	the	single	customs	tariff	and	the	Customs	Code,	
it	will	be	able	to	protect	itself	from	being	flooded	with	cheap	Chinese	products	
and	strengthen	its	position	in	energy	negotiations).	
It	is	also	vital	for	Astana	to	gain	facilitated	access	to	the	Russian	market	(approx-
imately	8%	of	Kazakhstan’s	exports	went	to	Russia	in2012).	Lifting	barriers	to	
trade	with	Russia	is	expected	to	boost	exports	from	Kazakhstan	(this	primar-
ily	concerns	the	metallurgical,	coal,	chemical	and	agricultural	sectors)	and	to	
increase	the	influx	of	foreign	direct	investments	to	this	country.	Kazakhstan,	
where	the	investment	climate	is	much	more	attractive	than	in	Russia	and	Bela-
rus35	 (less	bureaucracy,	 lower	fiscal	 levies	and	better	protection	for	investors),	
expects	that	business	will	want	to	take	advantage	of	emerging	opportunities	and	
relocate	production	there.	However,	on	the	other	hand,	integration	on	the	con-
ditions	dictated	by	Russia	brings	about	the	need	to	raise	import	duties	on	goods	
from	third	countries,	which	will	 result	 in	raising	 their	prices.	Strong	compe-
tition	from	Russian	manufacturers	may	adversely	affect	plans	to	diversify	Ka-
zakhstan’s	economy	and	develop	those	sectors	of	the	economy	which	are	not	in-
volved	in	raw	material	production	–	all	the	more	so	because	Russia	has	a	similar	
35	 In	the	World	Bank’s	Doing	Business	2012	rating,	which	evaluates	the	conditions	of	doing	busi-
ness	in	a	given	country,	Kazakhstan	was	ranked	47th	and	Belarus	67th,	while	Russia’s	position	
was	as	low	as	120th.	For	example,	to	start	a	business,	it	takes	19	days	in	Kazakhstan,	5	days	
in	Belarus	and	30	days	in	Russia;	to	get	an	electricity	connection	it	takes	88	days	in	Kazakh-
stan,	254	days	in	Belarus	and	281	days	in	Russia	(the	slowest	of	all	the	countries	covered	by	
the	survey);	 in	 terms	of	 investor	protection	mechanisms,	Kazakhstan	 is	ranked	10th	out	of	
the	183	states,	Belarus	79th	and	Russia	111th;	http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/FPDKM/
Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB12-FullReport.pdf
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problem,	as	its	economy	relies	heavily	on	exports	of	raw	materials,	and	is	not	
interested	in	sharing	technologies	with	Kazakhstan.	
Integration	as	part	of	the	Customs	Union	and	the	CES	has	had	little	impact	on	
the	 intensification	 of	 economic	 relations	 between	 Kazakhstan	 and	 Belarus.	
The	reasons	for	this	include	the	geographical	distance	between	the	two	econo-
mies,	infrastructural	limitations,	the	unattractive	trade	offer,	and	strong	com-
petition	 from	Russian	manufacturers.	Belarus’s	 share	of	Kazakhstan’s	 trade	
has	been	well	below	1%;	co-operation	with	Kazakhstan	has	been	of	minor	sig-
nificance	for	Minsk,	as	well.
belarus, which	is	in	conflict	with	the	European	Union	and	is	politically	and	
economically	dependent	on	Moscow,	effectively	has	no	other	alternative	but	
to	join	the	integration	process	initiated	by	Russia.	On	the	one	hand,	Moscow	
has	many	 instruments	 for	putting	pressure	on	Minsk,	which	 it	has	used	on	
numerous	 occasions	 to	 force	 President	 Lukashenka	 to	 pass	 decisions	which	
are	beneficial	to	it.	It	has	also	done	this	on	numerous	occasions	in	the	integra-
tion	process	(see	section	2.2	below).	On	the	other	hand,	Moscow	is	one	of	the	
few	allies	of	the	Lukashenka	regime,	and	by	backing	the	Belarusian	economic	
model	based	on	government	orders	and	distribution,	it	guarantees	the	contin-
ued	existence	of	this	regime.	As	a	consequence	of	joining	the	integration	pro-
cess,	Belarus	has	received	Russian	loans	and	subsidies	which	are	vital	for	its	
economy,	such	as	preferential	prices	of	energy	raw	materials,	including	duty-
free	supplies	of	Russian	oil	and	low	gas	prices36.	As	more	and	more	barriers	are	
being	lifted,	such	as	control	at	internal	customs	borders	and	the	introduction	
of	common	technical	and	sanitary	requirements	(many	such	barriers	had	been	
lifted	earlier,	as	part	of	the	Union	State),	Belarusian	goods	have	gained	facili-
tated	access	to	the	Russian	market	(35%	of	Belarusian	exports	went	to	Russia	
in	2012).	This	has	had	a	fundamental	impact	on	some	sectors	(over	90%	of	Be-
larusian	food	exports,	and	on	average	41%	of	its	exports	of	machinery,	equip-
ment	and	transport,	go	to	Russia).	Minsk,	like	Astana,	also	hopes	that	lifting	
the	trade	barriers	will	make	Belarus	more	attractive	to	investors.	Foreign	ex-
porters	and	investors	could	use	Belarus,	where	the	conditions	of	doing	busi-
ness	are	better	than	in	Russia,	as	a	doorway	to	the	Russian	market.	Minsk	also	
strongly	appreciates	the	fact	that	the	regional	integration	structures	are	based	
on	WTO	rules,	which	brings	it	closer	to	membership	of	this	organisation.	The	
WTO	accession	negotiations	are	currently	blocked	for	Belarus,	but	thanks	to	
36	 In	2012,	Belarus	paid	US$165	for	1000	m3	of	gas,	while	the	price	for	Ukraine	was	US$430.
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the	Customs	Union	Minsk	has	been	partially	implementing	the	international	
standards,	which	may	facilitate	 its	accession	process	 in	the	future	and	open	
up	access	for	Belarus	to	global	markets.	Yet	on	the	other	hand,	the	Belarusian	
market’s	totally	openness	to	Russian	imports	poses	a	threat	to	some	sectors	of	
Belarusian	industry,	whose	market	share	has	been	taken	by	the	more	competi-
tive	Russian	products.	This	especially	concerns	the	oil	refining	and	automobile	
sectors.	From	the	point	of	view	of	 importers,	raising	duties	on	goods	bought	
from	third	countries	has	meant	an	increase	in	the	prices	of	such	goods	and	de-
rived	products,	and	so	switching	to	supplies	from	Russia,	thus	becoming	even	
more	dependent	on	its	market.	
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are	not	involved	in	the	integration	process	as	yet.	
These	countries,	whose	economies	are	weak,	have	declared	their	readiness	to	
join	the	Customs	Union	on	the	one	hand,	but	on	the	other,	they	fear	being	dom-
inated	by	the	stronger	partners,	Russia	and	Kazakhstan.	Bishkek	hopes	that	
the	gains	will	outweigh	the	losses.	Since	stricter	control	has	been	introduced	
on	the	Kazakhstan/Kyrgyzstan	border	(which	has	become	the	Customs	Union’s	
external	border),	the	possibilities	of	re-exporting	Chinese	goods	to	other	CIS	
countries	have	been	dramatically	 reduced.	This	used	 to	generate	 significant	
incomes	for	small-	and	medium-sized	businesses	(Central	Asia’s	largest	whole-
sale	markets	are	located	in	Kyrgyzstan).	As	a	result,	in	connection	with	its	ac-
cession	to	the	CU,	Bishkek	wants	to	be	granted	preferential	rates,	for	example	
for	its	light	industry,	which	could	at	least	partly	replace	Chinese	production.	
At	the	same	time,	Bishkek	fears	that	membership	in	the	CU	could	give	rise	to	
problems	in	its	relations	with	the	WTO	(which	Kyrgyzstan	has	been	a	member	
of	since	1998).	If	customs	rates	in	Kyrgyzstan	were	changed,	the	country	would	
have	to	offer	expensive	compensations	to	its	WTO	partners,	since	the	condi-
tions	of	their	access	to	the	Kyrgyz	market	would	deteriorate.	Tajikistan	(which	
joined	the	WTO	on	2	March	2013)	has	stated	that	it	could	only	join	the	Customs	
Union	when	it	has	a	direct	border	with	the	other	CU	member	states,	i.e.	when	
Kyrgyzstan	joins	this	structure.	Dushanbe	fears	that	at	present	its	accession	to	
the	Customs	Union	would	not	offer	any	tangible	benefits,	but	would	restrict	its	
economic	relations	with	other	partners,	especially	China,	and	cause	price	rises	
(according	to	Tajikistan’s	estimates,	its	accession	would	cost	between	US$400	
and	US$500	million).	In	turn,	better	conditions	for	expatriate	workers	and	la-
bour	market	liberalisation	are	less	important	for	Tajikistan,	since	these	issues	
have	been	regulated	in	bilateral	Russian-Tajik	agreements,	which	were	signed	
in	autumn	2012.	Although	these	two	countries	are	of	marginal	importance	for	
the	effectiveness	of	the	integration	process,	Russia	has	been	consistently	per-
suading	Bishkek	and	Dushanbe	to	join	in	(although	in	the	case	of	Kyrgyzstan	
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it	 fears	 an	 uncontrolled	 influx	 of	 cheap	 Chinese	 goods).	 Moscow	 sees	 Kyr-
gyzstan’s	and	Tajikistan’s	membership	in	the	Customs	Union	as	confirmation	
of	its	influence	in	post-Soviet	Central	Asia,	and	as	yet	another	barrier	to	drugs	
being	smuggled	on	a	mass	scale	from	Afghanistan	(as	the	Afghanistan/Tajiki-
stan	border	would	become	the	CU’s	external	border).	
ukraine	has,	under	pressure	from	Moscow,	declared	its	readiness	to	become	
an	observer	in	the	CU,	although	Russia	has	made	it	clear	that	it	is	interested	
in	Ukraine’s	 full	membership.	 In	March	2013	Ukraine’s	Council	of	Ministers	
decided	to	create	a	working	group	for	deepening	co-operation	with	the	CU	and	
the	CES	 for	 further	growth	 in	 trade,	expanding	co-operation	and	attracting	
investments	to	Ukraine.	
On	31	May	2013	in	Minsk,	the	Prime	Minister	of	Ukraine	Mykola	Azarov	signed	
a	memorandum	of	deepening	cooperation	between	Ukraine	and	the	Eurasian	
Economic	Commission.	The	memorandum	provides	the	establishment	of	a	per-
manent	Ukrainian	representative	in	the	CU,	access	for	Ukraine	to	copies	of	the	
CU’s	public	documents,	and	the	right	to	submit	its	own	proposals	to	the	EuEC.	
Kyiv	also	received	the	opportunity	to	participate	in	open	meetings	of	the	CU’s	
highest	bodies,	albeit	only	upon	an	official	invitation.	In	Section	4	of	the	memo-
randum,	Ukraine	declared	its	“intention	to	abide	by	the	rules”	enshrined	in	the	
legal	documents	underlying	the	CU,	and	to	“abstain	from	any	actions	and	state-
ments”	which	would	affect	the	interests	of	the	CU.	The	document	is	declarative	
in	nature,	and	does	not	constitute	a	legal	obligation	to	integrate	with	the	CU.	
Ukraine	sees	economic	co-operation	with	the	Customs	Union	member	states	as	
very	important.	In	2011	these	countries	accounted	for	approximately	38%	of	its	
exports	(Russia	had	a	29%	share	in	its	exports)	and	45%	of	its	imports	(Russia	
had	a	35%	share	in	its	imports).	It	is	difficult	for	a	significant	part	of	Ukrainian	
production	to	find	an	alternative	to	its	eastern	neighbours’	markets.	Russia	is	
also	a	very	 important	 investor	 in	Ukraine.	 In	2011,	 it	accounted	 for	approxi-
mately	10%	of	direct	foreign	investments	(its	share	 is	certainly	much	larger,	
since	a	large	portion	of	investments	from	tax	havens,	including	Cyprus,	were	
de facto	Russian	investments).	
Ukraine	primarily	exports	machinery	and	transport	vehicles	to	Russia,	prod-
ucts	which	are	basically	uncompetitive	on	the	EU	market.	Therefore,	Ukrain-
ian	manufacturers	depend	on	their	eastern,	predominantly	Russian,	buyers.	
Manufacturers	of	food	and	agricultural	products	have	a	similar	problem;	the	
need	 to	meet	 the	 high	 sanitary	 and	 phytosanitary	 standards	makes	 the	 EU	
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market	 practically	 inaccessible	 to	 a	 significant	 part	 of	 Ukrainian	 products.	
The	Russian	market	is	also	of	fundamental	importance	for	many	metallurgical	
products	(for	example,	large-diameter	pipes).	However,	as	regards	the	metal-
lurgical	sector,	Ukrainian	and	Russian	manufacturers	are	above	all	competi-
tors	to	each	other	on	global	markets.	
In	 the	case	of	a	 large	part	of	Ukrainian	 imports,	Kyiv	 is	also	finding	 it	diffi-
cult	at	this	moment	to	find	an	alternative	to	Russian	suppliers;	above	all,	this	
concerns	oil	and	gas.	Given	the	fact	that	the	Ukrainian	economy	is	extremely	
energy-intensive,	this	is	vital	for	Ukraine’s	relations	with	Moscow.	
This	dependence	on	the	Russian	market	is	causing	many	Ukrainian	manufac-
turers	 to	 become	 especially	 interested	 in	 good	 relations	with	Russia,	which	
guarantees	 access	 to	 its	market.	However,	 those	 sectors	which	 are	 oriented	
towards	the	EU	market,	including	part	of	the	metallurgical,	chemical	and	ser-
vices	sectors,	are	interested	in	modernisation	and	Western	technologies,	and	
are	principally	aiming	to	improve	the	conditions	for	co-operation	with	the	EU.	
As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 Ukrainian	 government	 is	 making	 efforts	 to	 reach	
a	balance	between	Brussels	and	Moscow,	and	thus	be	able	to	derive	economic	
benefits	from	co-operation	with	both	its	most	important	economic	partners.	
Although	Kyiv	had	granted	high	priority	to	entering	into	the	Deep	and	Compre-
hensive	Free	Trade	Area	agreement	with	Brussels37	until	recently,	it	has	also	
decided	to	sign	a	free-trade	area	agreement	with	Russia.	These	two	agreements	
do	not	collide	with	one	another,	and	at	the	same	time	guarantee	facilitated	ac-
cess	to	the	markets	of	both	partners.	However,	deepening	integration	as	part	
of	the	Customs	Union	would	mean	the	need	to	declare	close	co-operation	with	
Russia,	as	well	as	a	loss	of	the	opportunity	to	receive	favourable	terms	of	trade	
from	 the	 EU,	which	 is	what	 the	Ukrainian	 government	 is	 trying	 to	 avoid38.	
Nevertheless,	maintaining	access	 to	 the	Russian	market	and	getting	a	 lower	
price	for	gas	bought	from	Russia	is	vital	for	Kyiv	(in	2012,	the	gas	price	set	for	
Ukraine	was	higher	than	that	paid	by	Slovakia	or	Germany).	The	Kremlin	has	
37	 Resolution	from	the	Verkhovna	Rada	of	Ukraine	of	19	May	2011.	
38	 President	Viktor	Yanukovych,	in	his	address	to	the	Verkhovna	Rada	on	7	April	2011,	sug-
gested	 that	 the	 Customs	 Union	 could	 co-operate	 with	 Ukraine	 in	 the	 3+1	 format	 (three	
member	states	of	the	Customs	Union	plus	Ukraine).	However,	he	did	not	explain	what	this	
co-operation	would	look	like.	During	2013	Ukraine	has	also	made	suggestions	that	it	could	
participate	in	the	CU	without	being	a	full	member,	for	example	as	an	observer	state.	How-
ever,	all	such	proposals	have	been	rejected	by	Russia.	Compare,	for	example:	http://www.
unian.net/news/559808-medvedev-o-chlenstve-ukrainyi-v-ts-ili-vse-ili-nichego.html
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hinted	on	numerous	occasions	that	it	is	making	both	of	these	issues	dependent	
on	Ukraine’s	membership	in	the	Customs	Union39.
2. The negotiation disputes
The	differences	in	the	interests	as	described	above,	the	disproportions	in	the	
potentials	(see	the	table	below)	and	the	time	limitations	have	all	made	the	pro-
cess	of	negotiating	the	integration	conditions,	even	within	the	narrow	group	
of	three	states,	a	very	difficult	and	tense	process.	Disputes	emerged	both	dur-
ing	the	establishment	of	the	Customs	Union	and	the	Common	Economic	Space	
alike.	 Confrontations	 mainly	 arose	 between	 Moscow	 and	 Minsk,	 although	
Astana	was	also	trying	to	protect	its	interests.
Belarus	and	Kazakhstan,	for	 instance,	both	protested	against	Moscow’s	pro-
posal	to	significantly	raise	import	duties	imposed	on	goods	bought	from	third	
countries.	They	both	feared	an	increase	in	prices	on	their	markets,	as	well	as	
growing	public	dissatisfaction.	The	Kremlin	agreed	to	make	only	partial	con-
cessions	 by	 introducing	 transitional	 periods	 for	 some	 goods	 (used	 cars	 and	
pharmaceuticals)	and	allowing	individual	persons	to	bring	up	to	50	kg	of	goods	
for	their	private	needs40.
Another	 dispute	 between	 Russia,	 Belarus	 and	 Kazakhstan	 concerned	 the	
distribution	of	import	duty	income.	Russia	initially	insisted	that	93%	of	the	
income	should	go	to	its	budget.	After	several	months	of	tough	negotiations,	
Moscow	finally	accepted	a	share	of	87.97%	in	May	2010	(which	took	effect	on	
1	September).
However,	 the	conflict	between	Russia	and	Belarus	reached	 its	peak	when	 the	
Common	Customs	Code	was	to	be	introduced.	The	code,	which	Belarus	refused	
39	 For	instance,	in	March	2011,	Prime	Minister	Putin	threatened	that	barriers	could	appear	in	
trade	with	Ukraine,	if	Kyiv	chose	to	continue	its	economic	integration	with	the	EU	(see	Rus-
sian	Federation:	Prime	Minister	Putin	 threatens	Ukraine,	EastWeek,	OSW,	 16	March	2011).	
In	turn,	on	18	May	2011,	Dmitri	Medvedev	warned	the	Ukrainian	government	that	it	must	
make	a	clear	declaration	of	whether	it	wants	to	integrate	with	Russia	or	the	EU.	He	recalled	
that	Russia,	which	was	not	a	WTO	member,	could	reintroduce	barriers	to	trade	with	Ukraine	
without	any	restrictions.	In	turn,	the	link	between	the	gas	prices	and	Ukraine’s	membership	
of	the	Customs	Union	has	been	mentioned,	as	in	Medvedev’s	statement	of	24	August	2011	(see:	
Medvedev	posovetoval	Ukraine	poprosit	u	Moskvy	skidku	na	gaz,	Lenta.ru,	24	August	2011).
40	 Before	the	Customs	Union	was	set	up,	residents	of	Kazakhstan	benefited	from	imports	of	
numerous	cheap	consumer	goods	from	China,	which	were	supplied	either	from	China	di-
rectly	or	via	Kyrgyzstan.	
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to	sign,	became	nothing	more	than	a	tool	in	the	hands	of	Alyaksandr	Lukashen-
ka,	who	insisted	that	the	Kremlin	should	lift	the	customs	duty	off	oil	and	petro-
leum	products	supplied	to	Belarus	(which	had	been	imposed	on	1	January	2007).	
In	response,	Russia	provoked	a	gas	conflict	with	Minsk,	cutting	off	gas	supplies41	
and	threatening	to	impose	export	duty	on	the	gas	it	supplied42.	As	a	consequence,	
the	Belarusian	president,	who	wanted	to	maintain	the	previous	preferential	con-
ditions	of	co-operation	with	Russia,	was	forced	to	accept	the	code.	However,	he	
only	did	so	after	a	five-day	delay,	which	was	symbolically	significant	and	dem-
onstrated	the	continuing	distrust	between	the	partners.	As	regards	export	duty	
on	the	oil	and	petroleum	products	supplied	to	Belarus,	Moscow	agreed	to	sup-
ply	only	the	part	of	duty-free	oil	allocated	for	Belarus’s	own	needs43	(according	
to	Russian	estimates,	these	preferences	are	worth	approximately	US$2	billion).	
However,	in	return,	President	Lukashenka	had	to	sign	a	package	of	agreements	
setting	up	the	Common	Economic	Space	in	December	2010.	
Export	duty	on	oil	and	petroleum	products	also	triggered	a	dispute	in	Russian-
Kazakh	relations.	In	an	attempt	to	withdraw	from	duty-free	oil	supplies	to	Ka-
zakhstan,	which	in	its	opinion	were	too	heavy	a	burden	for	the	Russian	budg-
et44,	Russia	started	demanding	compensation	from	Kazakhstan.	After	a	period	
of	negotiations,	during	which	Russia	also	reduced	its	supplies	to	Kazakhstan45,	
Astana	 agreed	 in	 June	 2012	 to	 supply	 Russia	with	 2	million	 tonnes	 of	 oil	 as	
compensation	 for	 the	duty-free	supplies	 from	Russia.	However,	 the	Kremlin	
announced	that	the	existing	preferences	would	only	continue	for	two	years,	
and	export	duty	would	be	imposed	on	oil	supplied	to	Kazakhstan	starting	from	
1	January	2014.	
41	 Kamil	Kłysiński	and	Wojciech	Konończuk,	Russia	provokes	a	new	gas	conflict	in	Belarus,	 
EastWeek,	OSW,	23	June	2010.
42	 Elena	Mazneva,	Strakhovka	ot	Batki,	Vedomosti,	5	July	2010.
43	 Belarus	imports	approximately	22	million	tonnes	of	oil	annually.	6	million	tonnes	are	used	
for	its	own	needs,	and	the	rest,	processed	in	refineries,	is	exported.	
44	 Until	 2012,	 Astana	 imported	 approximately	 7	 million	 tonnes	 of	 oil	 duty-free	 from	 Rus-
sia.	This	primarily	 concerns	northern	Kazakhstan,	where	 connection	 to	 the	Kazakh	 re-
sources	via	the	transport	network	is	lacking.	Above	all,	this	concerns	the	Pavlodar	refin-
ery,	to	which	oil	from	Russia	was	supplied	via	the	pipeline,	as	well	as	many	small	refineries	
to	which	Russian	 oil	was	 transported	 by	 railway.	According	 to	 the	Kremlin’s	 estimates,	
duty-free	supplies	of	oil	to	Kazakhstan	deplete	the	Russian	budget	by	approximately	US$2.5	
bil	lion	annually;	Astana	has	calculated	that	this	sum	does	not	exceed	US$1	billion.	
45	 In	May	2012,	Russia	even	cut	supplies	to	the	Pavlodar	refinery	in	Kazakhstan,	which	could	
be	interpreted	as	an	act	of	retaliation	as	Kazakhstan	had	not	signed	an	agreement	setting	
the	 rules	 for	 calculation	 of	 export	 duties	within	 the	 CU.	 Razvedka	 i	 dobycha	 SNG,	Rus -
energy,	5	March	2012.	
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The economic ratios of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in 2012
russia Kazakhstan belarus
GDP	(PPP),	US$	billions 2513.3 231.8 146.7
GDP	(PPP)	per capita,		
US$	thousands
17.7 13.9 15.6
Inflation,	%	as	of	year	end 6.6 6 21.8
Total	economic	investments,	
%	of	GDP
24.5 22.8	 38.9
Budget	surplus/deficit,		
%	of	GDP	
0.0 3.7 -1.1
Budget	deficit,	%	of	GDP,		
except	for	the	oil	and	gas	sector
-10.6 -9.3	 –
Current	account	balance,		
%	of	GDP
4.0 4.6 -2.9
Imports	(of	goods	and	services)		
in	US$	billions
312.6 44.5 50.1
Including	share	of:
Russia,
Kazakhstan	&	Belarus
–
6.1%
40%
–
approx.	50%
–
Exports	(of	goods	and	servic-
es),	US$	billions	
524.7 92.3 52.3
Including	share	of:
Russia,
Kazakhstan	&	Belarus	
–
7.4%
7.4%
–
37.1%
–
Reserve	funds		
(December	2012),	US$	billions
150.7 59.5 –
Currency	reserves		
(December	2012),		
US$	billions
537.1 28.3 8.0
Foreign	direct	investments,	
US$	billions
18.7 14 1.4
source:	Statistical	offices	and	central	banks	of	Belarus,	Kazakhstan	and	Russia,	the	IMF	
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The	concept	for	establishing	the	Eurasian	Economic	Union	in	2015	also	stirred	
up	dispute.	It	turned	out	that	the	countries	involved	in	the	integration	process	
had	different	visions	for	the	ultimate	co-operation	model.	According	to	origi-
nal	Russian	declarations,	the	document	setting	up	the	Eurasian	Economic	Un-
ion	in	2015	was	to	have	been	signed	in	March	2012;	however,	the	parties	were	
unable	to	reach	a	compromise.	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	chose	to	postpone	a	de-
cision	regarding	this	issue	for	several	years.	It	was	finally	agreed	that	the	draft	
agreement	would	have	to	be	submitted	for	signing	by	1	May	2014.
38
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
13
III. The economIc consequences and possIble fuTure 
developmenTs of The InTegraTIon process
1. economic effects of integration
1.1. for its participants
Lifting	 trade	 barriers	 usually	 contributes	 to	 boosting	 trade.	 Trade	 volumes	
have	increased	in	the	past	three	years,	also	within	the	Customs	Union;	they	
rose	25%	in	2010,	over	30%	in	201146,	and	8.7%	in	2012.	However,	it	is	difficult	to	
estimate	to	what	extent	this	growth	affected	the	integration	process.	The	tar-
iff	barriers	between	Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus	were	already	low	before	
the	CU	was	established,	because	these	countries	were	bound	by	a	 free	trade	
agreement	(with	numerous	exceptions,	it	operated	in	a	similar	way	to	the	CU).	
Meanwhile	the	non-tariff	barriers,	which	are	of	key	significance	for	intensify-
ing	trade,	have	been	being	removed	at	a	quite	slow	rate.	Furthermore,	a	natu-
ral	process	of	trade	volume	reconstruction	has	been	taking	place	over	the	past	
few	years,	since	the	drop	in	trade	volumes	during	the	crisis	in	2009.	
An	 intensified	 influx	 of	 Russian	 entities	 to	 Kazakhstan	 has	 been	 observed	
since	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Customs	 Union.	 The	 number	 of	 firms	 with	
Russian	 capital	 in	 2012	 increased	 by	 80%,	 exceeding	 900047.	 These	 are	 usu-
ally	firms	 from	Russian	 frontier	 regions,	 for	example	 from	the	agricultural,	
food	and	machine-building	sectors,	which	take	advantage	of	 less	bureaucra-
cy,	 lower	electricity	prices	(by	approximately	30%)	and	 lower	fiscal	 levies	 in	
Kazakhstan.	Some	Russian	firms	have	even	attempted	to	use	Kazakhstan	as	
a	tax	haven	within	the	Customs	Union.	However,	for	the	time	being,	relocation	
of	Russian	firms	to	Kazakhstan	is	not	a	mass	movement,	and	has	caused	only	
marginal	losses	to	the	Russian	budget	(approximately	0.01%	of	the	income)48.	
1.2. for third-party countries
The	creation	of	the	Customs	Union	between	Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	Belarus	
has	raised	the	customs	duties	on	some	goods	from	third-party	countries.	The	
access	conditions	 for	exporters	 from	the	European	Union,	 including	Poland,	
46	 Statistical	data	from	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission,	http://www.tsouz.ru/db/stat	2012
47	 http://tengrinews.kz/money/rossiyskih-biznesmenov-privlekayut-v-kazahstane-nizkie-
nalogi-i-loyalnyie-vlasti-230025/
48	 Natalia	Telegina,	Dobezhat	do	kazakhskoi	granitsi,	Magazine.rbc.ru,	July	2012.	
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have	deteriorated	as	a	result	of	the	establishment	of	the	CU,	primarily	in	Ka-
zakhstan	and	to	a	lesser	extent	in	Belarus.	However,	despite	these	unfavoura-
ble	changes,	trade	between	the	Customs	Union	member	states	and	third	coun-
tries	grew	by	almost	4%	in	2012.	In	2012,	an	increase	was	observed	in	Poland’s	
exports	 to	Belarus	(18%),	Russia	 (25.2%)	and	Kazakhstan	(24%).	The	Customs	
Union’s	most	important	trade	partner	is	the	European	Union,	which	accounts	
for	over	55%	of	its	exports	and	44%	of	imports.	The	second	most	important	part-
ner	is	China,	with	a	9%	share	in	exports	and	17%	in	imports49.	
Despite	the	increase	in	customs	duties,	the	establishment	of	the	Customs	Union	
and	the	implementation	of	the	single	market	rules	in	Russia,	Kazakhstan	and	
Belarus	will	bring	a	number	of	benefits	to	foreign	partners.	The	standardisation	
of	market	access	rules	should	reduce	the	costs	linked	to	handling	the	formalities	
and	obtaining	certificates.	For	example,	meat	plants	from	the	European	Union	
are	controlled	by	the	Customs	Union’s	 inspectors,	and	following	their	approv-
al,	can	export	products	to	all	 three	CU	member	states.	However,	on	the	other	
hand,	EU	exports	could	be	much	more	severely	affected	should	any	reservations	
against	European	products	be	made.	In	such	cases	exports	can	be	withheld	to	all	
three	states.	In	the	past,	when	Russia	imposed	embargos	on	(for	example)	Polish	
meat,	exports	of	such	products	to	Belarus	would	increase.	
One	more	positive	consequence	of	the	establishment	of	the	Customs	Union	was	
the	adjustment	of	the	rules	applicable	in	this	structure	to	the	World	Trade	Or-
ganisation	Standards.	This	also	forced	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan,	which	do	not	
belong	to	the	WTO,	to	apply	these	standards.	
Furthermore,	 lifting	barriers	 in	 internal	 trade	between	Russia,	Belarus	and	
Kazakhstan	offers	opportunities	 for	exporters	and	 investors	 from	the	Euro-
pean	Union	to	operate	on	the	markets	of	all	three	countries	from	out	of	that	
country	which	offers	the	best	conditions	for	business	development	(Kazakh-
stan	is	the	leader	in	this	aspect).	
2. prospects for regional integration
The	establishment	of	the	Customs	Union	and	of	the	Common	Economic	Space	is	
unlikely	to	significantly	improve	the	economic	attractiveness	of	the	countries	
engaged	in	the	integration	process	and	thus	contribute	to	an	increase	in	the	
49	 Data	from	the	Eurasian	Economic	Commission.
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influx	of	investments	and	rapid	economic	development.	The	conditions	for	in-
tegration	existing	so	far,	and	the	manner	in	which	they	have	been	implement-
ed	(poor	quality	of	law,	the	lack	of	executive	acts	and	the	fact	that	no	informa-
tion	policy	has	been	launched),	do	not	presage	any	major	liberalisation	in	trade	
or	improvement	in	the	investment	climate.	The	integration	has	primarily	been	
aimed	at	restricting	access	for	entities	from	third	countries,	and	has	not	been	
focused	on	improving	the	competitiveness	of	the	market	itself.	
The	 integration	process	will	 continue,	but	delays	 can	be	 expected	 in	 its	 im-
plementation.	It	is	also	doubtful	whether	it	will	be	possible	(and	if	so,	in	what	
form)	to	 fully	 implement	 the	documents	signed	as	part	of	 the	Common	Eco-
nomic	Space.	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	 fear	 the	possibility	of	becoming	com-
pletely	economically	dependent	on	Russia.	As	a	consequence,	they	are	reluctant	
to	transfer	the	competences	which	set	the	rules	of	operation	of	their	economies	
to	a	supranational	authority	dominated	by	Russia.	Restricting	the	competenc-
es	of	the	national	institutions	is	likely	to	cause	increasing	resistance	in	these	
countries.	Russia	has	sufficient	instruments	(for	example,	oil	and	gas	supplies,	
partial	control	of	the	transit	routes	and	political	dependence)	to	force	its	part-
ners	to	 implement	more	and	more	integration	documents.	However,	 if	 these	
countries	are	forced	into	the	integration,	they	may	make	attempts	to	disregard	
those	legal	solutions	which	are	unfavourable	to	them.	Resistance	can	especial-
ly	be	expected	from	Minsk,	since	a	total	implementation	of	the	CES	principles	
would	mean	a	deconstruction	of	the	present	model	of	the	Belarusian	economy	
as	controlled	by	President	Lukashenka	by	making	it	open	to	the	competition	
from	Russia.	
More	 countries,	first	 of	 all	Kyrgyzstan	 and	Tajikistan,	 are	 likely	 to	 join	 the	
Customs	Union	and	 the	Common	Economic	Space.	This	enlargement	will	be	
primarily	an	effect	of	Russian	pressure	on	the	leaders	of	these	countries.	It	is	
also	unlikely	that	Russia	will	offer	them	all	the	privileges	that	the	implemen-
tation	of	the	Common	Economic	Space	entails;	this	in	particular	applies	to	the	
free	movement	of	labour.	Russia	has	already	taken	steps	to	reduce	the	number	
of	expatriate	workers	from	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan.	
It	 also	appears	 that	Russia	has	 sufficient	 instruments	 (for	example,	 control-
ling	gas	prices	and	restricting	access	 to	 its	market	 for	Ukrainian	exporters)	
to	force	Kyiv	to	join	the	integration	structures.	Kyiv’s	participation	in	the	in-
tegration	process	would	certainly	mean	a	political	success	for	Moscow,	as	this	
would	negate	the	achievements	Ukraine	has	so	far	made	in	moving	closer	to	
the	European	Union.	Nevertheless,	Ukraine’s	forced	membership	is	unlikely	
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to	 improve	 the	 economic	 performance	 of	 the	 integration	 process.	 Kyiv	will	
certainly	be	more	determined	than	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	to	insist	on	inte-
gration	solutions	that	are	beneficial	for	itself	and	in	blocking	those	which	are	
unfavourable.	It	will	also	extend	the	process	of	negotiating	and	implementing	
the	agreed	principles.	
It can already be observed that the Kremlin’s political will to implement 
the integration process, which arose in 2009 partly because russia had 
been very severely affected by the economic crisis, is gradually weaken-
ing. russia is not ready to make compromises and concessions on the is-
sues which are vital for it, such as those concerning the energy sector. 
In effect, the integration is proving to be fragmentary, and covers only 
selected sectors of the economies involved in the process. additionally, 
more and more negative consequences of establishing closer co-operation 
as part of the cu and ces are being revealed, especially for Kazakhstan. 
furthermore, when the integration process is expanded to include issues 
which go beyond trade and economy, like the anti-trust policy or setting 
the domestic prices of energy carriers, the leaders of Kazakhstan and 
belarus tend to distance themselves. as a result, the integration has lost 
its initial momentum over the past few months. 
Iwona wIśnIewsKa
